Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations
A joint FAO/WFP update for the members of the United Nations Security Council
April 2021

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Contents

Acronyms ............................................. V

Introduction ........................................... 1
Methods and data sources ................................ 2
Overview ............................................ 4

Section 1. Conflict and hunger analysis. .......................... 4
   Asia and Middle East ........................................ 8
   Africa .......................................................... 9
   Sahel and West Africa region ................................. 10
   Central and Southern Africa ................................ 12
   The Caribbean .............................................. 13

Section 2. Highlighted countries of concern ....................... 14
   Burkina Faso .................................................. 16
   Nigeria (15 states and the Federal Capital Territory) ....... 19
   South Sudan .................................................... 22

Food security terms ........................................ 26
References ............................................. 28
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARI</td>
<td>Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Cadre Harmonisé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus disease 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWS NET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIEWS</td>
<td>Global Information and Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRFC</td>
<td>Global Report on Food Crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPCA</td>
<td>Food Crisis Prevention Network (<em>Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This is the eighth update of the *Monitoring Food Security in Countries with Conflict Situations*, a twice-yearly report on acute food insecurity in countries affected by conflict that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly produced for the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016.

This issue of *Monitoring Food Security in Countries with Conflict Situations* provides an update of the acute food insecurity situation in major food crises where conflict and insecurity are a primary driver of acute food insecurity. It also briefly describes other key food insecurity drivers (including indirect impacts from the coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19]), and how conflict and insecurity frequently interlink with – and sometimes exacerbate – them.

The present update covers nineteen countries and territories that are experiencing extremely grave hunger caused by protracted conflict and insecurity as reported in the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) and also regularly covered in the joint FAO/WFP updates to the members of the UNSC. Unlike the GRFC, the update does not cover refugee crises such as those affecting Uganda, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Syrian refugees in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

**Box 1. Countries and territories covered by the update**

Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, northern Nigeria, the Niger, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

For each of these countries and territories this update provides information on the number of acutely food-insecure people as of December 2020. It reports on developments in relevant conflicts and examines ongoing conflict–hunger dynamics, including inter-related drivers of acute food insecurity, such as climate shocks, economic destabilization and population displacement.

The update also spotlights the situation in Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria and South Sudan where there have been sharp conflict-related increases in acute food insecurity, flagging where constraints on humanitarian access to food insecure populations have been documented and there is evidence of conflict-specific food system damage.

By highlighting the severity, magnitude and drivers of acute food insecurity in this group of countries and territories, this update seeks to reinforce the urgent need for all parties, including governments and humanitarian and development agencies, to work to resolve conflict in order to end the current rising trend in the number of acutely hungry people reliant on humanitarian assistance.

On 24 May 2018, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2417, which specifically addresses conflict-induced hunger. Resolution 2417 identifies how conflict contributes to hunger – directly, through the effects of war, such as the displacement of people from farming or grazing land and the destruction of agricultural assets, and indirectly, by disrupting markets and increased food prices.

The resolution calls on parties to conflict to comply with relevant international law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare, and places the protection of, and access to, the most vulnerable and food insecure in situations of conflict at the forefront of its agenda. It recalls that the UNSC has adopted and can consider adopting sanctions against those responsible for obstructing humanitarian assistance. The resolution calls for early warning briefings by the UN Secretary-General when the risk of conflict-induced famine or widespread food insecurity occurs due to armed conflict.

This update seeks to respond to the call for the provision of relevant information to the members of the UNSC. Therefore, the overall aim of the joint FAO/WFP update, facilitated by the Global Network Against Food Crises, is to provide UNSC members with a concise, up-to-date overview that may inform the formulation of short- and long-term actions needed to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.

This report supports the range of analytical products generated within the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In May 2021, the Global Network, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, will release the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises; this will provide further information on global acute food-insecurity figures in 2020. It will be available at [www.fightfoodcrises.net](http://www.fightfoodcrises.net) and [fsinplatform.org](http://fsinplatform.org).
Methods and data sources

Out of the nineteen countries and territories covered in this update, sixteen countries and territories had comparable acute food insecurity estimates based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system or the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) and three countries and territories had food insecurity estimates based on the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) or other sources. For six countries and territories in the Sahel and West Africa, the data comes from the latest CH analyses, which uses standards similar to those of the IPC to classify acute food insecurity. The IPC and CH Phase scales and descriptions are comparable to one another (see “Food security terms”, for more details).

This update provides information on the number of people who are in the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC/CH classification – Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) – and who are in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is an extremely severe situation in which urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. Households in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified as Famine. Populations facing Stressed conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also indicated where relevant, although they require a different set of actions – ideally more long-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction to protect livelihoods.

For the analysis of drivers of food insecurity in each of these countries and territories, a wide range of secondary data sources was used to support the information provided in the IPC/CH analyses themselves. These include country situation reports and updates, market bulletins from WFP, food security and crop prospect outlooks from FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), the independent humanitarian analysis unit Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Additional sources include situation reports and country briefs from agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

1 CARI is used to classify individual households according to their level of food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach can be incorporated into IPC analyses. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see here. In Palestine, food insecurity is measured through the Socio-Economic Food Security Survey (SEFSEC). The results of the SEFSEC profile the Palestinian population through four categories of food security status (food secure, marginally food secure, moderately food insecure, severely food insecure).
Differences in methodology and approach with the Global Report Food Crises

While the GRFC aims to provide a global figure for all food crisis situations, this update focuses on a sub-set of countries and territories experiencing food crisis situations primarily driven by conflict and insecurity identified by the GRFC, which are regularly covered by the update.

Given its objective of regularly updating members of the UNSC on the evolving situation, the figures used for the update relate to the last quarter of 2020 and are not necessarily the same peak estimates used in the GRFC. More specifically, the late-2020 estimates for 8 countries out of the 19 countries and territories included in this update differ from the peak figures the upcoming GRFC.

This update provides information that is comparable to the last issue produced in January 2020. Therefore, it uses data and figures from late 2019 for comparison and to indicate trends. Finally, it provides projections for 2021 when comparable data are available.

Box 2. Overview of the different parameters of the 8th issue of the FAO/WFP update to the UNSC and the 2021 GRFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>FAO/WFP regular update (April 2021)</th>
<th>GRFC 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>19 countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity.</td>
<td>55 food crisis countries and territories globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection criteria</td>
<td>Major food crisis affected by conflict and insecurity, which are regularly covered by the update, excluding specific displacement crisis.</td>
<td>All countries that requested external assistance for food, as assessed by FAO-GIEWS, and other low or middle-income countries that had populations in need of international humanitarian assistance as regards their food security as a result of a shock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>Twice yearly.</td>
<td>Yearly, including an annual mid-year update.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Regular update on the situation.</td>
<td>Consensus-based analysis for a global overview of food crisis situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>Members of the UNSC.</td>
<td>Decision-makers at all levels and general public.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 GRFC 2020 included 55 countries and territories in food crisis.
3 Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, the Sudan and as Ethiopia have conflict/insecurity reported as secondary or tertiary driver in the GRFC 2020.
4 Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Mali, the Niger, South Sudan and the Sudan.
5 The 2021 GRFC is expected to be released on 5 May 2021.
Section 1. Conflict and hunger analysis

Overview

In late 2020, a general worsening of acute food insecurity has been observed across the 19 countries and territories with major food crises where conflict and insecurity are reported as primary drivers of acute food insecurity, compared with the situation in late 2019. This trend is expected to persist throughout mid-2021 and probably beyond (Figures 1 and 2). In these countries and territories, conflict and insecurity negatively impact food insecurity through various pathways – such as new displacements, disruption of trade and cropping, confinement of communities, abandonment of agricultural land and loss of life and assets – while also affecting access to humanitarian assistance.

In addition, conflict and insecurity are often aggravated by the growing impact of climate extremes as well as other risks and impacts from socio-economic shocks and food supply chain threats. These include the indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic or desert locust infestations.

The number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is of particular concern, as it describes an extremely severe situation in which urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. Households experiencing Emergency conditions typically have either large food consumption gaps, which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality or are partially able to mitigate large food consumption gaps only by employing negative livelihood coping strategies and asset liquidation.

The vast majority of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) have already seen their livelihoods – which are mainly based on agriculture and livestock, as well as fishing, to a lesser extent – hit hard by conflict and insecurity, which lead to population displacements, disruptions of trade and the supply of food and agricultural inputs and lack of access to natural resources, including water and land.

Trend analysis of most severe levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between late 2019 and late 2020 and projected evolution in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend between late 2019 and late 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, northern Nigeria and the Syrian Arab Republic experienced the largest increase in the number of people in acute food insecurity (increase of 1.4 million people or above) between late 2019 and late 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, northern Nigeria and the Syrian Arab Republic registered the largest percentage increase of people facing acute food insecurity (increase by more than 40 percent) between late 2019 and late 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The prevalence of high acute food insecurity in late 2020 exceeded 30 percent of the population analysed in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Palestine, South Sudan and Yemen. These levels are expected to persist through 2021 in most of these countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPC/CH projections for 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, northern Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen are expected to experience the largest increase in the number of people facing acute food insecurity in 2021 (increase of 1.4 million people or above).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, the Niger are expected to experience more than 40 percent increase in the number of people facing acute food insecurity in 2021.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 Comparability issues exist at country level between late-2019 and late-2020 IPC/CH analyses. In particular, for Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sudan, the population/geographical coverage of the late-2019 and late-2020 analyses is significantly different, meaning that the analyses are not directly comparable. For Nigeria, 15 states were analysed in late-2020 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), while 16 states and FCT were analysed in late-2019. In the latest South Sudan IPC analysis (issued in December 2020), the population analysed in the Jonglei state and Greater Pibor administrative area does not include the population from four payams located in the eastern part of the county. For the Sudan and Yemen, the different timeframes of analysis limit the comparability of late-2019 and late-2020 data, because seasonality is a significant factor in acute food insecurity in these countries. For Iraq, significant differences in population analysed exist between the two periods (entire country vs. conflict affected populations). For the Syrian Arab Republic, the different timeframes of the analyses limit the comparability of 2019 and 2020 data. For Palestine the different timeframes and methodology limit the comparison. Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed.

7 The increase for these countries and territories can also be partly attributed to seasonality, as in late 2020 most of them were in the post-harvest season, while in mid-2021 they will enter the lean season (when food stocks run out until the next harvest). Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are notable comparability issues as the population analysed increased between the 2020 and 2021 IPC analyses—from around 67 million people to 96 million. In this context, the prevalence of Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) outcomes within the population analysed slightly decreased between the two analyses—from 33 percent to 28 percent. Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. For Nigeria, 15 states were analysed in late-2020 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), while 16 states and FCT were analysed in late-2019 as well as in 2021.
Any further additional shocks could push people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) into Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). Therefore, Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is the final alarm calling for rapid action to avert famine and thus save lives.

As of late 2020, around 21.1 million people were in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 16 countries and territories where conflict and insecurity played a major role in driving acute food insecurity. This number increased by around 19 percent compared to the same period in 2019 and is expected to continue to increase in 2021, in at least 14 of these countries and territories.

In late 2020 and early 2021, Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen had areas of extreme concern where the populations, partially or completely cut off from humanitarian assistance, reached critical hunger situations following years of conflict and other shocks.

In these four countries and territories, there were around 6.2 million people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in late 2020 – this number is expected to reach around 8.6 million in 2021. An estimated 6.7 million also are projected to face similar levels of acute food insecurity conditions between February and July 2021 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It is expected that in South Sudan and Yemen around 155 000 people will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) conditions through mid-2021.

### Trend analysis of the Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity between late 2019 and late 2020 and projected evolution in 2021

#### Trend between late 2019 and late 2020

- Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Nigeria, South Sudan and the Sudan experienced the largest increase in the number of people – by more than 250 000 – in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) between late 2019 and late 2020.
- Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Nigeria and South Sudan recorded the largest percentage increase of the number of people – by more than 40 percent – in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) between late 2019 and late 2020.
- In Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen, the prevalence of Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) conditions within the population analysed reached the highest levels – from 9 to 14 percent – as of late 2020. In 2021, these levels are expected to persist or increase in most of these countries.

#### IPC/CH projections for 2021

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen are expected to experience significant increase in the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2021 – meaning more than 250 000 additional people compared to late 2020.
- Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and the Niger are expected to experience more than 100 percent increase in the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2021.

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8. Comparability issues exist at country level between the late-2019 and late-2020 IPC/CH analyses, in particular, for Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sudan regarding the coverage of the population, and for Yemen and the Sudan regarding the time coverage of the analyses. For Nigeria, 15 states were analysed in late-2020 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), while 16 states and FCT were analysed in late-2019. In the latest South Sudan IPC analysis (issued in December 2020), the population analysed in Jonglei state and Pibor administrative area does not include the population from four payams located in the Eastern part of the county. Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed.

9. The expected increase is based on the estimates available between late-2020 and 2021, which run until June-August for most countries and territories. Countries and territories for which 2021 IPC/CH projections were available at the time of the analysis were: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria (16 states and the Federal Capital Territory), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are notable comparability issues as the population analysed increased between the 2020 and 2021 IPC analyses—from around 67 million people to 96 million. In this context, the prevalence of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes within the population analysed slightly decreased between the two analyses—from 9 percent to 7 percent. Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. For Nigeria, 15 states were analysed in late-2020 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), while 16 states and FCT were analysed in late-2019 as well as in 2021.


All in all, the global acute food security outlook for the next months is concerning. Some countries are increasingly exposed to one driver or more that are interlinked and/or mutually reinforcing and set to deteriorate in early 2021. Conflict, insecurity and other forms of armed violence risk to increase in parts of Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger), Ethiopia, northern Nigeria, northern Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan.

In addition, it is worth noting that in these contexts, conflict and insecurity may be exacerbated by additional and overlapping drivers. More specifically, economic shocks – including the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic – are likely to linger into the second half of 2021, especially in Haiti, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. Moreover, weather and climate extremes driven by the ongoing La Niña event, expected to continue through April or May 2021, are likely to affect several parts of the world, including East Africa and Central and Southeast Asia. Finally, transboundary threats, such as the desert locust situation in East Africa and on the Red Sea Coast, and continued humanitarian access constraints in some countries remain among the compounding factors of food insecurity to be monitored closely in the coming months.
Figure 1. Five countries and territories experiencing the largest increase in the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) observed between late 2019 and late 2020* with projections for 2021, when available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Mid 2021</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Late 2021</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Late 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (15 states and FCT)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Five countries and territories experiencing the largest increase in the prevalence of the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between late 2019 and late 2020 with projections for 2021, when available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Mid 2021</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Late 2021</th>
<th>Late 2019</th>
<th>Late 2020</th>
<th>Late 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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* For the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia, the population coverage between late-2019, late-2020 and 2021 IPC analyses is significantly different, meaning that the analyses are not directly comparable. For Nigeria, 15 states were analysed in 2020 in addition to the Federal Capital Territory, while 16 were considered in 2019 and 2021. For the Syrian Arab Republic, the different timeframes of the analyses limit the comparability of 2019 and 2020 data. For Palestine the different timeframes and methodology limit the comparison.
Country snapshots

The reasons for the overall increase in acute food insecurity across the 19 countries and territories between late-2019 and late-2020 is context-specific and rooted in country-level dynamics. The analysis of the situation of acute food insecurity for each of the 19 countries and territories is provided below.

Asia and Middle East

In Afghanistan, around 13.2 million people – nearly 42 percent of the population analysed – faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from November 2020 to February 2021. This represents a 17 percent increase compared to the same period a year earlier. While most of the country recovered from the severe drought in 2018, it remained affected by multiple shocks, including conflict and related population displacements, weather extremes, crop pests and the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on populations with low resilience.

The number of food insecure people is expected to continue to rise over the coming months. Violence is likely to get worse, amidst uncertainty over the scheduled withdrawal of all foreign forces by May 2021. In addition, most parts of the country have experienced poor rainfall since November 2020, and forecasts indicate that the situation will continue until May. Low rainfall and snowpack, alongside above-average temperatures, could threaten the winter wheat crop and limit water availability for spring and summer crops.

Iraq remains affected by intermittent conflict and protracted displacement, as around 1.3 million people were internally displaced and 4.7 million people returned from displacement, as of late 2020 (IOM, 2020). COVID-19 containment measures also affected livelihoods and employment opportunities and reduced state revenues. In this context, the currency devaluation triggered in December 2020 further curtailed vulnerable households’ purchasing power by increasing inflation and imported good prices, despite government subsidized food prices. Out of 6 million conflict-affected people, about 731 000 people were food insecure in 2020 (OCHA, 2021; Food and agriculture sector, 2020). 13

In Palestine, around 2 million people were estimated to be facing acute food insecurity and in need of food assistance and/or support in maintaining their farming, herding or fishing livelihoods in 2020 (OCHA, 2020). 14

Such a deterioration – from around 1.7 million people affected in 2019 (OCHA, 2019) – mainly stems from the indirect impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on livelihoods and food security, compounding the protracted crisis and repeated conflict situation faced by Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. In particular, unemployment increased significantly in 2020 due to the impact of containment restrictions on the informal employment sector.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, the food security situation continued to deteriorate in late-2020, as around 12.4 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure, by far the highest number ever recorded (OCHA, 2021). 15 As reported by WFP, it includes 1.3 million people acutely food insecure and 1.7 million residing in camps and considered particularly vulnerable and dependent on external assistance. Food security in the country remains primarily affected by the protracted conflict and large population displacement, which significantly eroded the livelihoods and resilience of local populations. The impact of the conflict has been compounded by a devastating economic crisis since 2019. Although the global economic slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic has depressed global oil prices, the country is grappling with fuel shortages due to international sanctions and currency depreciation. The COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the already challenging situation that the country has been facing amid already high unemployment rates. Many casual workers rely on their daily wages, which have decreased significantly. In this context, agricultural activities have also been hampered by the high prices of domestic and imported inputs and high transportation costs. In addition, as of early December 2020, some pockets of dry weather conditions prevailed in the most eastern part of Hassakeh, the governorate with the largest planted area and cereal production in the country, and floods caused by heavy rainfall severely affected internally displaced person (IDP) sites in the northwestern parts of the Syrian Arab Republic.

13 This number refers to the food security people in need estimates, which are based on WFP CAR methodology.

14 Estimates of the number of people in need of food security assistance are based on the findings of the 2018 Socio-economic and Food Security (SEFSec) survey, adjusted to reflect the impact of the recent economic deterioration as a result of the pandemic, as well as population growth.

15 According to the results of the nationwide food security and livelihoods assessment conducted by WFP and the Whole-of-Syria Food Security Sector over the fourth quarter of 2020. These figures are considered to be preliminary humanitarian needs overview (HNO) figures. Food security people in need estimates are based on the WFP CARI methodology.
The factors that have contributed to the stiff economic deterioration in 2020 are likely to persist well into 2021, leading to additional weakening of the Syrian pound on the informal market, which will have a significant effect on consumer prices, purchasing power and livelihoods – further worsening the food security situation.

The food crisis in Yemen remained at critical levels, with an estimated 13.5 million people – or 45 percent of the population analysed – in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the last quarter of 2020 (IPC, 2020), taking into account the positive impact of the provision of humanitarian food assistance on food security. A further deterioration is expected in January–June 2021, with around 16.2 million people facing acute food insecurity and in need of urgent assistance, including 47 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – representing a threefold increase in the number of people facing such acute food insecurity conditions as compared to late-2020. Conflict has remained the major driver of acute food insecurity causing widespread displacement, humanitarian access constraints, disruption of public services, port blockades and restrictions, fuel crises and economic disruption. Rural farming dependent households are also facing increased food insecurity risks due to low production associated with high prices of inputs and diesel for irrigation and limited access to farmlands due to conflict. In addition, currency depreciation and a fall in foreign exchange reserves have contributed to significantly high prices in a country that relies mainly on imports to procure food. In this context, the COVID-19-related economic slowdown at the global level only has worsened an already dire situation.

Conflict and deteriorating economic conditions coupled with reduced funding for humanitarian assistance are likely to further increase acute food insecurity in the coming months. Conflict is likely to persist on existing frontlines, with renewed clashes erupting in Ma'rîb, Al Jawf and Taizz, and the potential escalation of conflict in governorates such as Al Bayda, Hajjah, Hudaydah, San'a'a and Sâ'dâda. The economic crisis is likely to continue, and the insufficient funding outlook for humanitarian assistance in 2021, based on significant reductions in 2020, may result in a further scale-down of humanitarian operations.

Africa

Eastern Africa

In Ethiopia, an estimated 8.6 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in October–December 2020, even before the conflict broke out in the Tigray region (IPC, 2020). The conflict and related displacement are likely to have further aggravated the acute food insecurity situation in early 2021, which was initially projected to reach 12.9 million people in need of urgent assistance through June 2021. Food security remains severely affected by the combined impact of desert locust infestations on crops and pastures as well as floods and lingering effects of past droughts, intercommunal conflict and the restrictions measures linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the Tigray region and all conflict-affected areas, insecurity has triggered large population displacement and significantly disrupted agriculture, livestock-rearing and other livelihoods, as well as markets and trade. In addition, the COVID-19-related containment measures have added additional strain on already stressed livelihoods and income opportunities (Ethiopia Agriculture Sector, 2020). Prior to the conflict in Tigray, the number of IDPs was estimated at around 1.9 million people and returning IDPs at 1.2 million people – with most of them displaced by conflict and insecurity (IOM, 2020). As of early 2021, the number of people in need of urgent assistance in Tigray is estimated to have increased from around 950 000 to almost 3 million (OCHA, 2021; WFP, 2021).

Significant macroeconomic challenges in the form of declining purchasing power and rising food prices will continue to affect food access. This will probably compound the effects of the lean season in Belg and Meher-producing areas (March–May and June–September, respectively). Cereal production and rangeland conditions will probably be affected by forecast below-average rainfall in Afar and northern Somali regions from March to May 2021. Finally, Ethiopia is likely to remain affected throughout 2021 by the worst desert locust upsurge in 25 years. There is cautious optimism that the current upsurge is winding down in the Horn of Africa, especially if poor rains limit breeding this spring in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia, followed by equally poor rains during the summer in northeast Ethiopia.

In addition to protracted conflict and related population displacements, Somalia remained affected by the lingering effects of severe droughts, severe and recurrent flooding desert locust infestations on crops and pastures and the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on the largely informal economy. In the last quarter of 2020,
Climate hazards, desert locust, COVID-19 and conflict are projected to drive high levels of acute food insecurity in 2021. Forecasts show mixed signals for the 2021 Gu season (April–June), with some models indicating an increased probability of below-average rainfall in southern and northwestern Somalia. Moreover, desert locusts are expected to continue to threaten crop production and pasture availability despite control operations. The socio-economic effects of COVID-19 resulting in below average incomes and above average food prices in some markets will continue to limit food access. In this context, a continuing dispute over the elections is likely to cause major political instability, violence and increased insecurity.

Between December 2020 and March 2021, around 5.8 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in South Sudan, including 105 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). This number only represents a slight decrease compared to the estimated peak number of people facing acute food insecurity during the lean season in May–July 2020, when 6.5 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) (IPC, January 2020), and is expected to increase to 7.2 million people – representing 60 percent of the population analysed – by July 2021 (IPC, December 2020). Four payams located in Pibor Administrative Area of Jonglei state were facing Famine likely (IPC Phase 5) conditions in late 2020, and such levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist until July 2021. Insecurity and population displacement remained significant in 2020 and continued to affect food production, markets and trade flows. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic aggravated an already critical situation characterized by currency depreciation and falling revenues from oil exports. Repeated flooding as well as a potential threat of desert locust further threatened livelihoods and food availability and access.

Subnational and localized violence could intensify with the ongoing dry season through April 2021, along with fighting between opposition and splinter groups as well as groups that did not sign the 2018 peace. Forecast above average rains could provide favourable conditions for crops but also enhances the potential for a third consecutive season of severe floods that could damage crops and disrupt livelihoods. Climate shocks and violence are likely to result in new displacements, compounding the impact of conflict and adding to the 1.6 million people currently displaced, further disrupting livelihoods and basic services (OCHA, 2020).

In the Sudan, nearly 7.1 million people were acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2020 (IPC, November 2020) – representing only a moderate improvement compared to the peak of food insecurity in June–September 2020 when around 9.6 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during the lean season (IPC, July 2020). Although economic shocks – marked by high inflation – and weather extremes such as flooding were the most significant drivers of acute food insecurity in 2020, insecurity resulting from social unrest and intercommunal violence persisted in the country as did protracted displacement. The desert locust infestations are also an important risk to food security in the country and requires close monitoring.

Purchasing power and food access are expected to continue to deteriorate as a result of rising food prices caused by high production and transport costs and the devaluation of the Sudanese pound. In addition, a revival of intercommunal clashes across Darfur led to significant displacement and similar episodes remain highly possible. The situation in eastern Kassala and Gedaref states, which host thousands of refugees from Ethiopia, remains critical.

**Sahel and West Africa region**

In Burkina Faso, the population facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) conditions increased by 66 percent between the last quarters of 2019 and 2020. Over 2 million people were acutely food insecure and required urgent assistance between October and December 2020 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2020) and this number is expected to reach 2.9 million – or 13 percent of the population – by mid-2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021). Conflict and cross-border displacement are the main drivers of this acute food insecurity. In addition, the indirect impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and weather extremes affected the livelihoods and food security of populations depending on crops and livestock as well as those living in urban areas.

Compared to the peak figure during the lean season June–August 2020, when an estimated 3.3 million people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), including 11 500 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) (CILSS-CH, 2020), the alert level in Burkina Faso for the next few months has been lowered slightly due to a marginal improvement in food security as a result of a relatively good main agricultural season.
last year. In addition, since October 2020, food assistance has been delivered to remote and previously inaccessible areas. The situation remains very concerning and requires close monitoring because violent insurgency and counterinsurgency are likely to continue to create insecurity and thus increase displacement, food insecurity and access issues.

In Cameroon, the share of the population estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance increased from 8 percent in October–December 2019 to 10 percent of the population analysed in October–December 2020. The conflict and insecurity persisted in the North-West, South-West and Far-North regions and continued to severely disrupt access to livelihoods and food by local populations. Weather extremes, such as floods and crop pest infestations as well as the COVID-19-related restrictions also had a negative impact on production, imports and income-earning opportunities.

### Central Sahel crisis

The crisis-affected Liptako-Gourma area comprises cross-border areas of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. In these areas, the population facing Crisis or worse conditions (CH Phase 3 or above) increased by 27 percent between the last quarters of 2019 and 2020. Between October and December 2020, around 2.6 million people were acutely food insecure and required urgent assistance (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2020). This number is expected to reach 4.3 million by mid-2021 (CILSS-RPCA-CH, 2021).

*The Liptako Gourma area covers eight regions in Burkina Faso (Centre, Centre-Est, Centre-Sud, Centre-Nord, Est, Plateau Central, Nord and Sahel), six regions in Mali (Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidâl, Menaka and Taoudénït) and three regions in the Niger (Tillabéri, Bosso and Niamey).


Chad remained particularly affected by conflict and insecurity in 2020, because of the situation in the Lake Chad Basin, insecurity near the Libyan border in Tibesti and refugee influxes from neighbouring countries. Moreover, macroeconomic difficulties deteriorated further due to the global economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, recurrent dry spells and floods had a negative impact on the livelihoods of pastoralists, farmers and urban populations. This situation brought an estimated 0.6 million people into high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) in late 2020, which was projected to almost triple by mid-2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021) and to largely exceed the peak of 2020 – estimated at one million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in June–August 2020 (SISAAP-CH, 2020).

In Mali, security conditions deteriorated further in 2020 and early 2021, particularly in the central and northern regions near the border with Burkina Faso and the Niger. COVID-19 containment measures constrained livelihood opportunities in rural areas, such as access to land, water and markets by herders, farmers and fishers. Floods and pest outbreaks further undermined food production in several areas. As a result, high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) affected an estimated 0.4 million individuals in the last quarter of 2020. This represents a seasonal decrease compared to the peak in 2020, when nearly 1.3 million people faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in June–August 2020 (CILSS-CH, 2020), and was expected to again reach 1.3 million people in June–August 2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021).

In some locations, particularly in Mopti and Ségué, insecurity may further deteriorate in 2021, leading to displacement and food insecurity. Moreover, over the coming months, pastoralists in Mali and the wider Central Sahel region will face domestic and cross-border mobility challenges during the peak of transhumance, due to security concerns and COVID-19-related border closures. For farmers, challenges will revolve around access to land in preparation for the agricultural season, with insecurity limiting access mostly in the tri-border area and the Lake Chad Basin.

In northern Nigeria (15 states and the Federal Capital Territory), the number of people facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) more than doubled between October–December 2019 and the same period in 2020, when it reached nearly 9.2 million (RPCA, 2020). Projections also indicate a further increase to around 12.8 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) by June–August 2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021). Conflict remained the main factor of acute food insecurity, with the Boko Haram insurgency and related conflict persisting in the three northeastern states and in the rest of the Lake Chad Basin, while central and northwestern states were affected by insecurity, banditry and inter-communal conflict. Poor macroeconomic conditions marked by currency depreciation and decreased state revenues were further aggravated by COVID-19 containment measures and their impact on incomes and trade. In addition, major floods led to localized crop production shortfalls and disrupted livelihoods.

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16. The CH analysis produced in November 2020 and covering October–December 2020 and June–August 2021 does not covers the state of Zamfara due to insufficient evidence.
Lake Chad Basin crisis

The Lake Chad Basin* comprises areas of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and the Niger. In these areas, the population facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) conditions increased by 26 percent between the last quarters of 2019 and 2020. Between October and December 2020, nearly 4.2 million people were acutely food insecure and required urgent assistance (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2020). This number is expected to reach 5.1 million by mid-2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021).

*The Lake Chad Basin covers one region in Cameroon (Far‑North), one region in Chad (Lac), one region in the Niger (Diffa) and three states in northeastern Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe).

Overall, in the next six months northern Nigeria is projected to face a marked deterioration of food security and nutrition due to the interaction of conflict and economic factors, aggravated by COVID-19 secondary impacts. In the northeast in particular, the situation remains of extreme concern over the coming months due to heavy humanitarian access constraints and ongoing conflict, particularly in some localities of Borno state. Should the situation deteriorate further, these areas may be at risk of famine.

Acute food insecurity levels have remained significant in the Niger primarily due to conflict and population displacement in bordering areas and in neighbouring countries. Around 1.2 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in October–December 2020 – compared to around 2 million people at the peak in June–August (CILSS-CH, 2020). The number of people facing such conditions is expected to increase to 2.3 million by June–August 2021 (RPCA-CILSS-CH, 2021). Similarly to neighbouring countries, floods also severely affected houses, infrastructures, food production and livestock herding. In this context, COVID-19 restrictions exacerbated the negative impact of preexisting drivers on incomes and high food prices. In some locations, particularly in Tillabéry and Diffa, insecurity may further deteriorate in 2021, leading to displacement and food insecurity.

Central and Southern Africa

The Central African Republic remains one of the countries most affected by food crises as almost half of the population analysed – 41 percent or 1.9 million people – were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) food security conditions between September 2020 and April 2021 (IPC, October 2020). This represents a limited seasonal decrease in food insecurity compared to the peak in 2020, when an estimated 2.4 million people corresponding to 51 percent of the population analysed were facing high levels of acute food insecurity in May–August 2020 (IPC, May 2020). Figures are projected to increase again between May and August 2021 to around 2.3 million. The protracted conflict persisted and increased in intensity in 2020 and at the beginning of 2021. The population was further deprived of livelihood options and access to food because of recurrent extreme weather as well as animal and crop diseases and pest infestations – including cassava disease, locusts and fall armyworm infestations.

Armed violence by non-state armed groups is expected to continue to drive displacement, affecting markets and disrupting livelihoods in the coming months. The violence is likely to be protracted, causing increased tensions around the upcoming legislative election rounds in March and May 2021. Food prices are also likely to remain high over the coming months, especially in the capital, with insecurity blocking key trade corridors.

Acute food insecurity deteriorated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as nearly 21.8 million people, which corresponds to 33 percent of the population analysed, faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between July and December 2020 (IPC, 2020). Between February and July 2021, it was estimated to increase to 27.3 million people – 28 percent of the population analysed – even though this is to a large extent due to an increase in the analysis coverage and population analysed (IPC, 2021). Conflict and insecurity remained the main driver of food crisis with millions of people displaced in eastern, southeastern and southern provinces. COVID-19-related restrictions added further difficulties to the economy already affected by currency depreciation and high food prices. Weather extremes, such as floods, as well as crop and animal diseases and pests also had a severe impact on production of and access to food in a context of protracted humanitarian crisis and generalized poverty.

This figure covers 16 states and the Federal Capital Territory.
Over the coming months, amid renewed military operations, intercommunal tensions and a fragmented security environment, conflict-driven mass displacement is unlikely to see a meaningful reduction in the eastern provinces. Moreover, the resurgence of Ebola may further aggravate the food security situation. Floods and landslides are also very likely in areas where excess rainfall is expected, which could drive additional displacements and affect livelihoods. Finally, macroeconomic conditions related to ongoing currency depreciation and gross domestic product (GDP) declines will affect the purchasing power of the most vulnerable people, while COVID-19-related measures that restrict cross-border exchanges could contribute to a decline in economic activity.

Conflict and insecurity have become increasingly significant in driving acute food insecurity and population displacements in Mozambique in 2020, more particularly in Cabo Delgado as well as to a lesser extent in the central provinces of Manica and Sofala. Insecurity in Cabo Delgado has also exerted additional pressures on neighbouring provinces, like Nampula, Niasa and Zambezia, due to the influx of IDPs from Cabo Delgado. Drought has persist for a third year mainly in the southern provinces, severely limiting water and food availability and triggering increases in food prices in a context of poor economic conditions and decreasing incomes due to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19. In addition, floods resulted from Tropical Storm Chalane and Eloise have further added pressure on livelihoods, in particular in the provinces of Inhambane, Manica and Sofala. Around 2.7 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in October–December 2020 and this number is projected to increase to 2.9 million through March 2021 (IPC, 2021).

In Cabo Delgado, despite a decrease of conflict levels in January 2021, violence is expected to intensify again as the rainy season comes to an end in March 2021 and, as a result, displacement may further increase. On the last week of March 2021, Non-state armed groups (NSAG) attacked again the District of Palma resulting in several casualties and further displacement of civilian populations (OCHA, 2021). A spike in COVID-19 cases since January 2021 and the related reintroduction of restrictions against its spread are also expected to affect livelihoods and exacerbate humanitarian needs in the country.

The Caribbean

Haiti remained particularly affected by food crisis as 41 percent of the population analysed – or 4 million people – was confronted by Crisis or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3 or above) between August 2020 and February 2021 (IPC, 2020). Seasonal improvements in food security were therefore particularly limited compared to the peak of acute food insecurity estimated in March–June 2020 when 4.1 million people faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during the lean season (IPC, 2019). High acute food insecurity is projected to reach nearly 4.4 million people by June 2021. Poor macroeconomic conditions marked by high inflation rates, currency depreciation and reduced remittances from abroad further worsened in the context of COVID-19 restrictions and global economic slowdown and fuelled social unrest in a context of socio-political crisis. Prolonged dry conditions and below average rainfall caused crop production deficits and deteriorated livestock body conditions in 2020. Tropical cyclone Laura also had, to some extent, negative impacts on agriculture and livelihoods.

Food access and availability are expected to deteriorate in Haiti in the coming months, driven by a combination of economic decline, poor harvests in past agricultural seasons and potential new crop losses in the event of further below-average rainfall during the first rainy season between April and June, which remains a moderate risk. In addition, growing socio-political instability, with protests likely to intensify over the coming months, may aggravate the economic slowdown through blockades and disruptions. The deterioration of economic indicators, in particular a renewed downward trend for the local currency value after sudden its appreciation in Autumn 2020, combined with increasing inflation, is reducing incomes and purchasing power among the most vulnerable.
The conflict and hunger analysis points to dramatic increases in the number of people facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in several countries, as well as other very concerning trends between late 2019 and late 2020. The countries and territories registering the largest increase in relative terms are Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria and South Sudan. While the situation appears to have improved in Burkina Faso since the 2020 lean season (June–August 2020), when 11 500 people were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5), the number of people facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or worse) in late 2020 was 66 percent higher than a year earlier– therefore still worrying. In northern Nigeria the increase was around 115 percent. In South Sudan, the prevalence of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) reached almost half the population in late 2020, including 105 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

There has been a sharp conflict-related deterioration in food insecurity in these three countries/territories, documented humanitarian access constraints in reaching food insecure populations and evidence of conflict-specific food system damage.

The United Nations Security Council resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access and provides the Security Council with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. It also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, highlighting that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

The 2417 resolution stresses that “…objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “…objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets… and irrigation works”, must not be destroyed, targeted or rendered useless.

In late 2020 and early 2021, Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria and South Sudan had areas of extreme concern.

This section seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2417 in these three countries and territories. It explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on food security from the perspective of protecting civilians, as well as the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access, both of which are addressed by resolution 2417. Any further deterioration in these areas over the coming months could lead to a risk of famine.

For each of these countries and territories of concern, three distinct conflict-related impacts referenced in resolution 2417 are examined:

1. Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Mass-displacement due to conflict and conflict-induced hunger continues to proliferate in crises around the world. Displacement remains a major concern in Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria and South Sudan. Although population movement is primarily linked to violence, the inability to provide food for family members is also a clear factor in displacement. Fighting has cut off many communities from infrastructure, transport routes and markets, leaving people food insecure, particularly during lean seasons. This phenomenon has accelerated population movements in all three countries and territories of concern.

2. Impact of conflict on food systems

One of the most worrying aspects of contemporary conflicts is their impact on essential food systems and objects indispensable to the survival of civilian populations. Farms, crops, grazing pastures, fisheries, irrigation systems, mills and food processing and storage sites are all targeted with alarming regularity. Such actions are specifically referenced in resolution 2417 and continue to be encountered by United Nations agencies in crises around the world, including in all three countries and territories of concern.


Objects indispensable to survival (OIS) are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as “…foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”
3. Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work

Humanitarian access remains one of the most critical issues affecting aid agencies operating in complex emergencies and underpins resolution 2417. As in so many other contexts, obstacles to reaching people in need are significant and contribute directly to food insecurity in each of the three countries and territories examined in this section. Furthermore, constantly shifting political and security landscapes are a major source of disruption for humanitarians in protracted conflicts. There is compelling evidence of interference and disruption faced by humanitarians in all three countries and territories of concern.
Food security overview

Current acute food insecurity | October–December 2020

- 2.0 million people in CH 3+  
  9% of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

Projected acute food insecurity | June–August 2021

- 2.9 million people in CH 3+  
  13% of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

Sources: RPCA-CILSS-CH, December 2020 and April 2021

An estimated 2 million people – 9 percent of the population – faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between October and December 2020, which represents an increase of 66 percent compared to the same period in 2019.

In late 2020, the most food insecure regions were the Sahel, Centre-Nord, Nord and Est. These remained the most affected by conflict, insecurity and population displacement, with around 75 percent of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity and 90 percent of internally displaced populations.

Around 130 000 people were estimated to be facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity in the regions of Sahel, Centre-Nord and Est between October and December 2020. This number represents an increase of 370 percent compared to the same period in 2019, and is expected to further increase by mid-2021.

The number of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance are expected to remain considerable during the 2021 June–August lean season, particularly in Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, Est, Nord and Sahel. Around 2.9 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 344 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). In addition, 4.8 million people are likely to face Stressed (CH Phase 2) acute food insecurity levels.²⁰

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Conflict and insecurity affect the regions of Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, Est, Nord and Sahel in particular, causing humanitarian access issues, trade disruption and large-scale population displacement. Security incidents also negatively affect the functioning of food markets and rural livelihoods in these areas. In early 2021, incursions by armed groups continued to significantly constrain the availability of and access to food for populations in the Liptako-Gourma areas across the border with Mali and the Niger (FAO-GIEWS, 2021). Cattle raids and general insecurity have forced pastoralist households to increase livestock sales and destocking, both to meet food security needs and flee to safer areas (FEWS NET, 2021).

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

The sharp deterioration in the security situation in the past two years has led to a serious worsening of the humanitarian situation, including massive population displacement, particularly affecting the Sahel, Centre-Nord, Nord, Est, Centre-Est and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. Around 1.1 million people were reportedly internally displaced by January 2021, almost double the estimate a year earlier (IOM, 2021). The most striking effects are seen in the abandonment of cultivated land and the loss of other productive assets, including livestock. Despite favourable vegetation conditions in late 2020, pastoral communities faced limited access to pasture due to insecurity (RPCA, 2020), and disruption of traditional markets in the Liptako cross-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, severely disrupting incomes. IDPs and host populations in these areas have become more dependent on food assistance as their usual sources of food and income have been disrupted as a result of the violence. Declining purchasing power and insufficient aid are forcing them to reduce the quantity, quality and number of daily meals.

Impact of the conflict on food systems

During 2020 the deterioration of the security situation, high levels of displacement and floods severely affected agricultural productivity, causing a decline in agricultural production of between 20 and 50 percent compared to pre-conflict levels (FEWS NET, December 2020). This led to the early depletion of household stocks, making both IDPs and host populations increasingly dependent on markets and humanitarian assistance. In addition, improvised explosive devices, blockades, frequent NSAG attacks on markets and the movement of big traders to less insecure areas have all significantly disrupted food supplies.

In Centre-Nord, key informants report that the most cited reason (67 percent) for people having insufficient access to food was insecure access to land or waterways (USAID-REACH, 2020). Several road improvement projects linking important localities in conflict zones had to be stopped due to repeated security incidents, and improvised explosive devices have been used on a number of existing roads crucial for food assistance to isolated localities, resulting in the death and injury of civilians and the destruction of supply trucks.

Conflict-related trade disruption triggered significant food price increases during the lean season between June and August 2020 – up by 33 percent year-on-year in Djibo (Sahel region) and 31 percent in Yako (Nord region) – and reduced access to income-generating activities (WFP, 2020). An average price increase of 30 percent is forecast for July 2021 for main cereals consumed in Burkina Faso, significantly reducing purchasing power. These factors will expose IDPs and host populations to acute food insecurity until at least September, when the new harvest is expected.

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work

Widespread insecurity is having a severe impact on humanitarian access in Burkina Faso. The government is still facing a very volatile security situation in many of the country’s northern and eastern regions, where NSAGs operate and target humanitarian actors to prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance. During 2020, food intended as either general food assistance or as part of school feeding programmes has been stolen by NSAGs.
In November 2020, three aid workers were threatened and physically assaulted in Tapoa (Est region) (UNHCR-INTEROS, 2020). Attacks against aid workers are disturbingly common and it is estimated that a third of kidnappings targeting humanitarians globally take place in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger (ACAPS, 2021).

Improvised explosive devices laid along several key transport routes have killed and injured civilians, destroyed supply vehicles and severely restricted humanitarians’ ability to move freely. This has limited the quantity of supplies being delivered to markets and the obstruction of food assistance. The destruction of bridges by NSAGs to disrupt the movement of government forces has presented another obstacle to humanitarian access, particularly in the Sahel region (iMMAP/DFS, 2021). Negotiating humanitarian access has been complicated by the fact that it is often unclear which NSAGs operate in certain areas of the Centre-Nord, Est, Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. The situation is particularly critical in the Sahel region, where various NSAGs are vying for control.
From October to December 2020, a total of 9.2 million people or 9 percent of the analysed population were facing the worse acute levels of food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) in 15 states and the Federal Capital Territory – an increase of around 115 percent comparing to the same period in 2019.

More than one third (or 3.4 million) of people facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) levels of acute food insecurity were located in the three northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (in the Lake Chad Basin) between October and December 2020.

During the same period, more than 660,000 people were estimated to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Of particular concern were five Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno state – Marte, Mobbar, Kukawa, Gubio and Abadam.

Between June and August 2021, the number of acutely food insecure people in need of urgent assistance is expected to increase to nearly 12.8 million (or 12 percent of the population analysed), including 0.8 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Around 34 percent of the affected population will likely be located in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, including many communities in inaccessible or only partially accessible areas.

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**Food security overview**

Current acute food insecurity | October–December 2020

- **9.2 million people in CH 3+**
  - 9% of the population analysed, facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

Projected acute food insecurity | June–August 2021

- **12.8 million people in CH 3+**
  - 12% of the population analysed, facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

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**CH acute food insecurity phase classification**

- 1–Minimal
- 2–Stressed
- 3–Crisis
- 4–Emergency
- 5–Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Areas not included in the analysis

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This projection covers 16 states and the Federal Capital Territory.

22 The CH analysis produced in November 2020 and covering October–December 2020 and June–August 2021 does not covers the state of Zamfara due to insufficient evidence.


In 2019, the analysis covered 16 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
Violence in Nigeria, driven by the extremist insurgency, is at its worst since 2015 and intensified in late 2020, mainly centred in Borno state in the northeast (ACLED, 2021), displacing populations across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. NSAG attacks and clashes with government forces affected livelihoods and agricultural activities, while intercommunal conflicts and banditry led to a below-average harvest in the north-central and northwest regions. Increased violence in the northwest and north-central regions is concerning, with deep-rooted intercommunal strife increasing the number of people in need of food and livelihood assistance; this is now overlaid with a growing spread of insurgent groups from the northeast.

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Over 2.9 million people have now been displaced by conflict across northern Nigeria (UNHCR, 2020), many without access to arable land or fisheries around Lake Chad (FEWS NET, 2018). Two rival NSAGs have intensified attacks in recent months. In January 2021, Geidam town in Yobe state was attacked by Boko Haram, resulting in the displacement of approximately 10 000 people.

A January 2021 IOM survey identified a total of 728 688 IDPs across eight states in northwest and north-central Nigeria (IOM, 2021). Internally displaced populations remain particularly vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition. In the northwest, several areas (including Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara) have been heavily affected by cropland abandonment in 2020 due to population displacement and movement restrictions. The worst affected localities are situated far from urbanized areas, often close to forests, where NSAGs usually establish their bases of operation (WFP, 2021).

Impact of conflict on food systems

The deteriorating security situation has severely affected the agricultural sector in the northeast. Sixty-five percent of households in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states are reliant on farmland (WFP, 2019), but limited access to land and population movement due to conflict is causing a significant decrease in food production. In some areas (Kala, Balge and Marte) the cultivation of arable land decreased over 90 percent between 2010 and 2020 (WFP, 2021). More than 100 agricultural workers harvesting rice were killed in an attack by Boko Haram in the villages of Koshobe and Zabarmari near Maiduguri in late November 2020 (Research Centre on Civilian Victims of Conflict, 2020). Fear of attack by NSAGs, as well as associated military restrictions to ensure safe zones within a perimeter around communities, restricts farmers’ access to land. Even when land can be reached often less than a hectare is accessible, reducing levels of production.

Attacks by NSAGs, and their frequency, have been shown to be strongly correlated with declines in normal market operations in northeast Nigeria. Importantly, the vast majority of markets that saw a decline in activities have been affected by a threat or perceived threat of violence (Van Den Hoek, 2017). As a consequence, while markets and traders in the northeast are typically resilient, the added layer of underlying insecurity makes transporting goods very expensive, with costs being passed down to consumers in increasingly market-dependent households.

Fishing in conflict-affected areas has been severely curtailed as water bodies remain inaccessible, while in some cases fishing equipment has been destroyed or stolen by NSAGs (FEWS NET, 2021). Violence in the northwest and north-central regions is driven mainly by intercommunal competition over scarce resources, often between pastoralists and sedentary farmers (International Crisis Group, 2020). There has been a marked increase in criminality, banditry, cattle rustling and kidnapping. There are reports from northwestern grain-producing states, such as Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna, that “fees” are extorted from farmers before they are allowed to harvest their crops. Farmers are being threatened with kidnapping if they fail to pay as much as 40 percent of the value of their produce (Bloomberg, 2020).

Worryingly, there is an increase in activity in these areas by insurgent groups from the northeast. The resulting instability has led to the disruption of markets and reduced livelihood activities and has increased food insecurity. The destruction and theft of agricultural property and equipment, as well as the fear of having agricultural efforts ruined, has significantly diminished farmers’ motivation to cultivate. Similarly, livestock production remains below average due to the persistent threat of cattle rustling (FEWS NET, February 2021).

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22 Data from ACLED shows the number of violent incidents increasing in recent years, rising by 59 percent between the second half of 2017 and the second half of 2020.
Reduced agricultural production has led to high food prices, reducing the purchasing power of already vulnerable populations. The most-affected households remain highly dependent on humanitarian food assistance. Access to pastoral resources as well as transhumance movements remain difficult for pastoralist communities affected by insecurity (FAO-GIEWS, 2021). While livelihood support has enhanced local food production, crisis-affected households are yet to return to pre-conflict production levels, and more people are facing increased vulnerability due to the erosion of coping mechanisms and destruction of livelihoods and economic assets (FEWS NET, December 2020).

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work

The majority of people with critical food insecurity are in Borno state, as a result of serious humanitarian access constraints due to the ongoing conflict. The local government areas of Abadam, Dikwa, Guzamala, Kukawa and Marte, as well as other only partially accessible garrison towns, remain of extreme concern. Should the situation deteriorate further, and access remain impeded, these areas may be at risk of famine (FAO and WFP, 2021).

Humanitarian access across northern Nigeria is becoming increasingly complex. In some areas that remain inaccessible to humanitarians, particularly in Borno state, the violence has left households increasingly vulnerable due to a combination of poor harvests and restricted access to markets, livelihoods and food assistance. Members of these communities are facing significantly elevated levels of malnutrition (FEWS NET, March 2021).

In northeast Nigeria, attacks by insurgents on government and humanitarian workers are frequent, severely restricting aid distribution to high-risk areas where needs are often the most acute (FEWS NET, March 2021). Recent attacks in parts of Borno state have jeopardized the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In January 2020 a humanitarian hub in Ngala was attacked by NSAGs that burned an entire section of the facility as well as one of the few vehicles used for aid delivery. In March 2020, NSAG fighters launched an attack on Dikwa, breaking into the nearby humanitarian hub hosting 20 aid workers. Government forces eventually forced the NSAG fighters out of Dikwa, but not before they seized several military and INGO vehicles used in aid delivery and set ablaze a portion of the humanitarian hub.

In the northwest a new humanitarian crisis is emerging. Banditry has made kidnapping a lucrative business and is restricting humanitarian access. Increasingly prolific criminality includes killing, cattle rustling, kidnapping, rape, the torching of entire villages and the looting of valuables.

In the northwest a new humanitarian crisis is emerging. Banditry has made kidnapping a lucrative business and is restricting humanitarian access. Increasingly prolific criminality includes killing, cattle rustling, kidnapping, rape, the torching of entire villages and the looting of valuables.
South Sudan

Food security overview

Projected acute food insecurity | December 2020–March 2021

- **5.8 million people in IPC 3+**
  - 48% of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

Projected acute food insecurity | April–July 2021

- **7.2 million people in IPC 3+**
  - 60% of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

Source: South Sudan IPC Technical Working Group, December 2020

- An estimated 5.8 million people, representing 48 percent of the population, faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity in the 2020 post-harvest season (December 2020–March 2021), which is usually the season least prone to acute food insecurity in the country. However, it represents an increase of 38 percent compared to the 2019 post-harvest food security analysis (September–December 2019).
- The most food insecure areas in late 2020, where more than 50 percent of the population were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity included Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal.
- About 1.8 million people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) acute food insecurity during the post-harvest, in late 2020. This is double the number reported during the 2019 post-harvest season.
- In the period April–July 2021 (lean season), an estimated 7.2 million people (60 percent of the population) are likely to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity, with an estimated 2.4 million people likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 108,000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). This represents a sharp increase as compared to the same time last year, where a total of 6.48 million was projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) outcomes, of which 1.75 million were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The proportion of people experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes or worse is expected to reach 20 percent of the total population by mid-2021.

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Overview of conflict impact on food security

The cumulative effect of conflict over the years and across the country has resulted in displacement, destruction of assets, disruption of livelihoods and deterioration of people’s resilience. People have had fewer options to cope with compounded shocks and stressors including flooding, insecurity and the COVID-19 pandemic (IPC, 2020). Staple food prices are high – the price of white sorghum in Juba almost doubled during 2020 (FEWS NET, 2021). Insecurity and political and economic instability has also led to: (i) low crop production, depletion of food stocks and reduced income for purchasing food and other basic needs; (ii) limited access to basic health and nutrition services; and (iii) hindered investments in infrastructure, commercial markets and trade. This is evident in not only an increase in the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity in 2021, but also in the severity of food insecurity as more people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) acute food insecurity outcomes.

While the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan has resulted in a notable reduction in conflict at national level, subnational and localized violence intensified in 2020. This resulted, last year, in more than 350 000 people being displaced and over 2 000 casualties, as well as destruction of, and impediments to safe access to, community assets and basic service facilities. The uncertainty that still prevails around the progress on the Peace Agreement further reduces the confidence of displaced populations in relation to their return and hinders their ability to pursue livelihood opportunities and rebuild their lives. Moreover, scarcity of resources can lead to strained co-existence between IDP and host community populations (OCHA, 2021). Insecurity hampers humanitarian assistance, as convoys have been attached, prepositioned commodities looted, routes closed due to heightened insecurity risks and populations not being able to safely access services and assistance.

Conflict remains a main driver of food insecurity, accumulated vulnerabilities and displacement. On the other hand, where parts of the country have experienced increased stability, such as parts of Western Equatoria, populations have returned and agricultural production has rebounded (FAO-WFP CFSAM, 2018; FAO-WFP CFSAM, 2019; FAO-WFP CFSAM, 2020).

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Since the start of the conflict in December 2013, nearly 4 million people have been displaced, both as IDPs and refugees (UNHCR, 2019). In 2020, a further 70 000 people were newly displaced, in addition to the pre-existing 1.6 million IDPs (UNHCR, 2020). By June 2020, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was sheltering 181 231 IDPs across the country. Over 2 million South Sudanese have fled the country (UNHCR, 2021).

Escalation of subnational violence, localized violence and insecurity have triggered displacement of households in a number of counties (OCHA, 2020 and 2021). Ongoing inter- and intra-ethnic attacks – often highly politicized – between communities have destroyed villages across the South Sudan, including in Jonglei, Warrap, Greater Pibor Administrative Area and Western Bahr el-Ghazal. Homes, farms and food storage facilities have been deliberately destroyed and looted to provoke displacement, hunger and loss of livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of civilians (Human Rights Council, 2020). In Tonj North and East, significant episodes of violence, including the theft of crops and livestock, arson and continued subnational and localized violence, displaced about 18 000 people in October 2020 alone (CSRF, 2021).

According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, during 2020 localized violence, in Jonglei state and the Western payams of Pibor County (Gumuruk, Pibor, Likuongole and Verteth), has generated significant displacement and contributed to extremely high levels of acute food insecurity. Between October and November 2020, these areas were classified as “famine likely” (IPC Phase 5), and these acute food insecurity conditions were projected to persist through the next lean season in July 2021 (IPC, November 2020). According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, due to displacement thousands of people are increasingly unable to engage in livelihood activities and obtain food through traditional agricultural activities. Free and safe movement is vital for this population as they move outside their county to trade cattle for staple foods.

Two other payams (Kizongora and Marow) are also at risk of famine in the coming months if current trends persist and more displaced people enter the central areas of

26 Famines can be classified in two ways depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available for classification. If evidence is adequate, areas can be classified as experiencing famine. If evidence is limited, but available evidence meets minimum parameters and the IPC consensus building and quality assurance functions are completed, areas can be classified as “famine likely”. IPC Famine Review Committee, Conclusion and Recommendations for Pibor County—South Sudan—IPC Analysis, (November 2020).
Pibor, followed by new attacks and instability in these areas (IPC, November 2020).

Finally, the implementation of a national framework on return, resettlement and reintegration, launched in 2019, has been delayed, with key actors consistently failing to meet their commitments (Human Rights Council, 2020).

Impact of conflict on food systems

Strategies by belligerents in the national conflict since 2013, as well as in subnational violence since the signing of the Revitalized Peace Agreement in 2018, to attack objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population have contributed significantly to food insecurity in South Sudan. In 2020, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found that such tactics had been used in the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal (2017–2018), Jonglei (2017–2019) and Central Equatoria (2018) (Human Rights Council, 2020). The Commission reported that it had reasonable grounds to conclude that militias and armed groups systematically attacked, pillaged, destroyed and rendered useless food infrastructure and systems in order to punish non-aligning communities (Human Rights Council, 2020). According to the Commission, soldiers were instructed to loot and destroy goods and equipment essential to the survival of rural populations, including harvests and livestock.27

In 2021, the Commission has reaffirmed that reasonable grounds remain to believe that militias and armed groups attacked, destroyed and rendered useless objects indispensable to the survival of the population and used starvation of civilians as a means of achieving military objectives. Primary means of livelihood, such as fresh crops, livestock and ready harvest on which civilians were dependent for their survival, were destroyed and looted (Human Rights Council, 2021). In June 2020, for example, water treatment installations providing clean water to at least 15 000 households in Pibor County (Jonglei state) were deliberately destroyed (Human Rights Council, 2021).

Analysis has demonstrated an inverse correlation between cereal production and instances of violence, when conflict spreads to major producing areas (Crop Monitor, 2020). According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, conflict between communities reached unprecedented levels in 2020 in the Likuongole and Gumuruk payams of Pibor county (Jonglei state) and resulted in burning of crops, severe impact on livestock production and pastoral livelihoods and the widespread destruction of infrastructure, including markets and food storage and processing facilities. In the same payams, many crops have been either destroyed by raids or cattle transiting, compounded by unprecedented floods, leading to very limited, or even non-existent, harvests in 2020. This has left whole communities without food stocks until at least July 2021 (IPC, November 2020).

In South Sudan the use of landmines and banditry by armed groups (OSAC, 2019), coupled with damage to road networks, makes transportation slow, expensive and dangerous, and hinders farmers’ access to markets and agricultural supplies and equipment (World Bank, 2019). In the last quarter of 2020, the price of fuel spiked significantly, further undermining transportation, contributing to increased food prices (FEWS NET, 2021) and reducing the possibility to cultivate during the 2021 agricultural cycle.

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work

In South Sudan, humanitarian access continues to be constrained by operational interference and violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, significantly inhibiting humanitarian action. Since June 2020, 16 humanitarian workers have been killed, one has been kidnapped and 27 have been injured, mostly during ambushes on clearly marked humanitarian vehicles. Bureaucratic impediments have also affected the humanitarian community’s ability to operate, with aid workers being detained for several days.

In recent years the activities of international humanitarian aid organizations have been deliberately obstructed, systematically preventing them from reaching areas to deliver vital foodstuffs. This has included the arbitrary detention of humanitarian aid workers, with at least 117 detained for prolonged periods in 2018 (Human Rights Council, 2021).

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan has reported that government-imposed restrictions to, and denial of, humanitarian access have followed a consistent pattern indicating that civilians are deliberately being denied humanitarian aid, especially in Jonglei state (Human Rights Council, 2021). Furthermore, the Commission has concluded that it has reasonable grounds to hold to account specific actors for arbitrarily

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27 The situation is exacerbated by the fact that soldiers are often not properly remunerated or able to support themselves and are encouraged to loot as a means of sustaining themselves. See conference room paper of the Commission (A/HRC/40/CRP.1).

denying humanitarian aid to populations in need in Central Equatoria.

Despite reassurances about a Presidential Standing Order ensuring humanitarian access to affected populations in February 2020,29 civilians, including humanitarian workers, continued to face the risk of road ambushes by armed groups, including regular troops, who loot travellers’ possessions, cars, motorbikes and, in the case of humanitarian workers, humanitarian supplies, medicine and communications equipment.

Between February 2020 and January 2021, the intensification of fighting in Jonglei, Warrap and Greater Pibor Administrative Area resulted in significant loss of life, particularly among civilians, and prevented humanitarians from operating in extensive areas. Between May and August 2020, eight humanitarian workers were killed in Jonglei and Greater Pibor Administrative Area (OCHA, 2020). On 29 October, unidentified armed actors attacked three staff members of the NGO Plan International returning to Pibor town after providing nutrition services to conflict- and flood-affected beneficiaries. One was killed (USAID, 2020).

According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, in the western payams of Likuongole, Gumuruk and Verteth in Pibor county (Jonglei state), food assistance storage facilities were destroyed during subnational violence in 2020. As of late 2020, commodities could not be pre-positioned and the scaling up of humanitarian activities was compromised due to ongoing security risks (IPC, November 2020). In late January 2021, five WFP trucks carrying sorghum and cooking oil to the Luachjang community were stopped and looted near Kacuat in Tonj East (WFP, 2021).

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Food security terms

The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is a unifying tool that allows for a relevant consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis of the current and projected food and nutrition situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It allows to classify the severity of food and nutrition insecurity according to the international classification scale through an approach referring to well-defined functions and protocols. The CH and the IPC have the same analytical framework for analysing acute food insecurity and share the same core functions that form the fundamental bases of the analytical process.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition. This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

IPC/CH classification terms and definitions:

- **Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).** Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition. Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. Households in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified as Famine.

- **Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2).** Populations and areas classified in these acute food insecurity outcomes are indicated where relevant, although they require a different set of actions – ideally more long-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction interventions to protect livelihoods.

- **Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5).** The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met. The special protocols are the following:
  - The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM) and crude death rate (CDR) – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (>20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and CDR> 2/10 000/day).
  - Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
  - Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

- **Famine-likely (IPC/CH Phase 5).** The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine-likely, it can trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

- **Famine-like conditions.** In order to support Famine or Famine-likely Classification, at least 20 percent of households should be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). This indicates that households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified as Famine. This can occur due to the time-lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.

- **Risk of famine.** The factors resulting in a risk of famine include high percentages of the population living in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity situations, heavy constraints to humanitarian access and a likelihood of worsening food insecurity situations due to conflict, economic blows and climate shocks. Urgent and at-scale targeted humanitarian action is needed to prevent hunger or death in these most at-risk situations and to safeguard the most vulnerable communities.
Negative livelihood coping strategies include unsustainable coping strategies, i.e. stress, crisis and emergency coping strategies, as per the Livelihood coping strategies, which is an indicator to measure the extent of livelihood coping households need to utilize as a response to lack of food or money to purchase food. For instance, populations of households experiencing large food consumption gaps (Emergency, IPC Phase 4) are also more likely to be engaging in crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies, such as selling the last adult female livestock or selling land.

WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) is used to classify individual households according to their level of acute food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator fits within the IPC analytical framework. However, while the IPC classification is based on consensus-building and convergence of evidence, the WFP CARI analyses a set of primary data from a single household survey based on five indicators. More information available here.
References

**Afghanistan**


**Burkina Faso**


**Cameroon**


**Central African Republic**


**Chad**


**Democratic Republic of the Congo**


**Ethiopia**


Haiti


Iraq


Mali


Palestine


Mozambique


Niger


Somalia


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