



**Global Network
Against Food Crises**

Integrated
actions for
lasting solutions

Financing flows and food crises

Global analysis of humanitarian and development
assistance to food security, agriculture and nutrition

Technical note





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This Technical Note has been prepared by the Technical Support Unit (TSU) of the Global Network Against Food Crises based on research and analysis from Development Initiatives. The note also underwent a rigorous technical review by several partners including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the partners of the Global Network Against Food Crises concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by the partners of the Global Network Against Food Crises in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

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Acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
CH	<i>Cadre Harmonisé</i>
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plans
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GHRP	Global Humanitarian Response Plan
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
TSU	Technical Support Unit of the Global Network Against Food Crises
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States dollar

Executive summary

In 2019, one hundred and thirty-five million people in 55 countries and territories were in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance – the highest on record. As put forward by Global Network Against Food Crises partners in the takeaway messages from the Global Network high-level event in 2019, unless we urgently scale up our efforts and ensure that we have the right programmes, approaches and financing in place to meet these growing needs, we will fail in our commitments to ‘end hunger’ by 2030.

This technical note provides an overview of the types and availability of external financing flows to food sectors to food crisis situations around the world between 2016 and 2019. It covers humanitarian and development investments in food security, agriculture and nutrition in food crisis contexts. This global overview highlights potential gaps and imbalances of funding between countries – by comparing food related financial flows across countries – and in relation to their food security levels – by presenting acute food insecurity figures as provided by the four available editions of the Global Report on Food Crises which provide the number of people that experience Crisis or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3 and above) of food insecurity as per the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) scales.

Specifically, this analysis covers the international humanitarian assistance from 2016 to 2019 and official development assistance to food sectors from 2016 to 2018, with 2018 being the last year such data was available at the time of the analysis. It does not consider external financing to food sectors in support to the COVID-19 pandemic response, which rapidly developed during 2020.

Starting from an overview of the trends in food-related international humanitarian assistance to countries with food crisis situations, including an analysis of the funding under the UN-coordinated appeals, the analysis explores the balance of food-related international humanitarian financing and official development assistance with a deeper analysis of the ten major food crises between 2016 and 2019. Lastly, the analysis includes specific insights into the sectoral allocations to food security, agriculture

and nutrition, and the channels of delivery for different kinds of assistance.

Overall, the evidence draws attention to the fact that, globally, the majority of humanitarian crises have food and nutrition security implications, with significant levels of acute food insecurity. In particular, 54 food crises absorbed 97 percent of food-related international humanitarian assistance (as a four-year average over 2016-2019) and 54-percent of food-related official development assistance (as a three-year average over 2016-2018). In addition, within the 54 food crises, food sectors absorbed a significant share of the overall international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance flowing to those countries: 30 percent of the total humanitarian assistance was allocated to food sectors and 10 percent of total development assistance.

Trend analysis shows that flows of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors increased by 23 percent between 2016 and 2019. This follows the growing number of people in need of urgent humanitarian food and nutrition assistance, which has consistently increased during the same period to 135 million people in 2019. Nevertheless, the distribution of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors between countries with food crisis situations was disproportionate, with significant disparities of funding per person.

The data also reveals that, in general, food crises received a limited proportion of official development assistance compared with international humanitarian assistance between 2016 and 2018, especially crises that were protracted in nature. Ten out of the 35 major food crisis countries received more than 60 percent of their external financing in the form of international humanitarian assistance even though eight of these ten are characterized by protracted food crises.

The analysis also examines the share of international humanitarian and official development assistance to food sectors in relation to the nature of the food crisis, specifically, its major drivers. Data shows a positive trend in the levels of both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to countries where conflict and insecurity are major drivers of acute food

insecurity. It is worth mentioning that conflict contexts saw consistent development investments regardless of rising humanitarian needs – and allocations – over the period of analysis. This stands in contrast to countries primarily affected by climate variability and extremes, and economic shocks, which received stable levels of official development assistance, on average, but saw decreasing levels of international humanitarian assistance. However, it should be noted that meeting humanitarian needs in these contexts remain a precondition to achieve resilience and sustainable development outcomes.

Overall, the analysis offers some conclusions and implications in better preventing, preparing for and addressing food crises:

- For the best food security outcomes, international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance should go hand in hand. Building long-term resilience of vulnerable population requires better integration and, where appropriate, sustained levels of official development assistance to address the structural causes of hunger and to reduce needs over time. A ‘nexus approach’ in food crisis contexts can therefore help greatly in ensuring that both kinds of aid are appropriately layered and sequenced, with the humanitarian assistance focused on tackling rising levels of hunger and malnutrition, and the official development assistance directed to address the underlying drivers of food insecurity.
- Stronger coordination and evidence-based advocacy is needed to support more equitable and needs-based allocation of external financing to food crises, including more attention to the so-called forgotten food crises.
- Structural changes are needed to the way external financing is distributed and food crises are handled, so that humanitarian assistance can be reduced over time through longer-term development investments that tackle the structural causes of hunger. External financing is most effective when it goes hand in hand with a policy environment to ensure both allocations and investments have the widest possible impact on short- and long-term food security, which is not always the case for most of the countries that experience protracted food crises.
- Conflict and insecurity are the major drivers behind acute food insecurity, often aggravated by the growing impact of climate change, as well as other impacts from socio-economic shocks. Therefore, food related development investments in these countries are both necessary and smart. As such, there is need for better integration of conflict and climate analysis to inform programme design, the insertion of crisis modifiers in programme cycles, and an increased flexibility and stability of such funding. This implies to move beyond a “food only” dimension to include actors and initiatives outside the food sector. On the other hand, food crises mainly characterized by climate extreme and slow onset events, should have a stronger focus on disaster risk reduction and management, climate change adaptation, and disaster and climate risk interventions. These may include early warning mechanisms, anticipatory actions, risk-informed and shock responsive social protection, and other interventions that support governments and ongoing domestic efforts.

All things considered, despite the increase of humanitarian and development financing to food sectors between 2016 and 2019, the number of people in acute food insecurity has continued to grow. As such, further efforts need to be made not only to ensure that the level of financing meets growing needs but that it is the right kind of financing, delivered in the right place at the right time. Addressing the structural problems of food systems in ways that will reduce humanitarian needs over time will require coordinated financing along a continuum between humanitarian and development. That way, development investments can, wherever possible, address these issues and, ultimately, have the widest possible impact on long-term food security. This will require involving development actors earlier and more intensely in protracted crises, strengthening nexus approaches, and ensuring that the aid architecture to address food crises is ‘fit for purpose’ model.

Introduction

Why this report?

The 2020 Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) reported the highest global number of acutely food insecure people on record. It revealed that in 2019, some 135 million people in 55 countries and territories were in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance as a result of conflict, climate variability and extremes, economic shocks, or a combination of any of these drivers. Given existing vulnerabilities and crises, the effects of COVID-19 on food security and nutrition is placing an additional burden on fragile political and social systems. This is compounding existing risks and exacerbating acute food insecurity in countries that already face food crisis situations. While humanitarian assistance remains critical to promptly save lives and livelihoods and alleviate human suffering, it is clear the need to increase efforts and coordination to address the root causes of food crises and acute hunger in a sustainable manner.

Against this background, the Global Network Against Food Crises in recent years has released a series of analytical products to help practitioners and decision makers better understand food crises. For the most part, these products have focused on *where* and *when* to intervene to prevent and alleviate human suffering – less so on the *how*. Products like the Global Report on Food Crises have provided the international community with an evidence-based analysis of the urgent need for food, livelihood and nutrition assistance in food crises. When it comes to assessing the global response to these crises, however, there is no analytical product that looks in detail at different ways to finance food security, agriculture and nutrition interventions in such contexts, specifically with an eye on external financing, including both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance.

In this context, the Technical Support Unit (TSU) of the Global Network Against Food Crises has developed this technical note in an effort to better understand the evidence on the types, availability and effectiveness of different external financing flows that are currently used to address food insecurity and malnutrition and strengthen the food systems in countries with food crisis situations.

This technical note provides an overview of the international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to 54 food crises.¹ It identifies potential gaps and imbalances in the external humanitarian and development allocations to food sectors between countries with food crisis situations, as well as areas that should be prioritized in future financing decisions. Specifically, this analysis covers the external financing allocated to food security, agriculture, and nutrition, with both humanitarian and development objectives from 2016 to 2019 (with 2018 being the last year data on official development assistance was available at the time of the analysis). It does not consider external financing to support the COVID-19 pandemic response, which rapidly developed during 2020.

The information provided in the note aims at outlining a path for greater coordination at the global, regional and national levels when it comes to establishing or refining financing strategies and when assessing their progress in food crisis contexts. Ultimately, the findings support the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda declaration for “coherence of developmental and humanitarian finance to ensure more timely, comprehensive, appropriate and cost-effective approaches to the management and impact mitigation of natural disasters and complex emergencies”.² It aims at contributing to the ongoing efforts to meet the targets of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 on ‘ending hunger’ by providing timely, transparent and actionable information to ensure that the right type of financing is available for the right action, at the right time and in the right place. These factors are critical to meeting immediate needs while also addressing root causes of vulnerabilities and risks for reducing hunger and food insecurity and malnutrition over time.

This technical note is a first attempt to collect and analyze food security, agriculture, and nutrition external financing with the objective of supporting enhanced coherence in financial allocations in countries with food crisis

¹ In the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises, 55 countries were originally defined as food crisis. Ecuador (Venezuelan migrants), however, was excluded from this analysis due to a lack of disaggregated financial data for the displaced population alone. See p. 13 of the GRFC 2020, or maps 77-78 on pp. 220-221: FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020: Joint analysis for better decisions. Rome, FSIN. Available [here](#)

² UN General Assembly. 2015. Addis Ababa Action Agenda on the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, A/RES/69/313. Available [here](#)

situations. As a matter of facts, the note highlights the need for improved reporting and monitoring of financial information.

An analysis focused on external financing for countries with food crisis situations

This analysis compiles internationally comparable data on external flows to food sectors in terms of official development and international humanitarian assistance, with a specific focus on external financing for countries that experience food crises as identified by the Global Report on Food Crises. Whenever possible, it provides a trend analysis of the volume of external financing allocated to food sectors globally and nationally. Moreover, data on international humanitarian assistance to food sectors is analyzed alongside figures on acute food insecurity at country level taken from the four available editions of the Global Report on Food Crises³, which provide the number of people that experience *Crisis* or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3 and above) of food insecurity as per the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH) scales⁴. This is to assess, for instance, the allocations of assistance to the food sectors in relation to the levels of acute food insecurity in food crisis contexts, as well as highlighting potential disproportions in allocations across countries.

International humanitarian assistance and official development assistance are important elements in supporting countries' development objectives.⁵ That said, it is important to note that these constitute only two sources of funding among a range of other public and private international and domestic financing flows that are not included in this analysis (e.g. government resources, foreign direct investments, international and domestic private sector investments, and remittances). Therefore, one of the main limitations of the analysis is that it presents only one aspect of the financing that

contributes to food security, agriculture and nutrition.⁶

The analysis starts with an overview of the trends in international humanitarian assistance to food crises, including an analysis of the funding under the UN-coordinated appeals. Then, it explores the balance of international humanitarian and official development assistance with a deeper dive on the ten major food crises in 2016-2019. Lastly, the analysis provides specific insights on the sectoral allocations and channels for different kinds of assistance.

Methodology

The analysis benefited from the collaboration with Development Initiatives⁷ that extracted and calculated the data on external financing to addressing food insecurity, with both humanitarian and development objectives in countries and territories that are facing food crises (see box 1 on geographical coverage) and made this data available to the Technical Support Unit of the Global Network Against Food Crises. The primary source of data on international humanitarian assistance is the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In particular, commitments and paid contributions to the food sectors recorded in the dataset. The FTS also provides the data on funding progress against Humanitarian Response Plan (HRPs) and other appeals. For refugee response plans and other appeals such as the Syria 3RP, data from UNHCR was also used to complement the analysis. The main source for tracking official development assistance data is the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Specifically, the gross disbursement to the food sectors recorded in the dataset. Data labeled as humanitarian assistance on the CRS has been excluded from the analysis, in order to reduce the possibility of double counting of funds between these two data sources.

³ FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020: Joint analysis for better decisions. Rome, FSIN. Available [here](#)

⁴ IPC and CH are the protocols used by the Global Report on Food Crises for classifying the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity. Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance. More information on the IPC/CH classification system is available [here](#)

⁵ The percentage of official development assistance on central government expense in food crises countries varies quite significantly from country to country (see World Bank data [here](#)). Generally speaking, however, in many food crisis contexts the proportion of official development assistance directed towards agriculture, food security and nutrition represent a significant share of overall assistance.

⁶ For instance, government spending data does not follow the same data standards and codes used in other financing flows, such as official development assistance funding detailed within the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD. Although there are international standards for overall government spending data and sector-specific reporting standards, not all governments follow these and the standards do not encompass coding separately for agriculture, nutrition and food security. For these reasons, a specific methodology to track government spending across these areas is under development and testing.

⁷ See <https://devinit.org/> for more information.

Data challenges and limitations:

- The technical note provides an analysis only of the international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance allocated to the food sectors (food security, agriculture, and nutrition) and directed to countries defined to be in food crisis situations. The analysis does not take into account other sources of financing to these countries, such as government resources, foreign direct investments, international and domestic private sector investments, or remittances.
- The technical note only looks at external financing to the food sectors and does not include other sectors, although they critically contribute to food security and nutrition outcomes (e.g. investments in sustaining peace and peacekeeping, or flows under early recovery, health, logistics or coordination). Moreover, the analysis does not capture external financing allocated to multiple sectors and food-relevant sectors. Capturing these flows is difficult due to data availability and the way data is reported from countries.
- Official development assistance data from the OECD's CRS disaggregated by country was only available up to 2018 (at the time of the analysis). It was therefore not possible to compare development and humanitarian assistance in 2019.
- Sector coding from the OECD's CRS is not the same as the sector coding used by OCHA's FTS. Therefore, the types of food security assistance being captured between the different sources could be different.
- No parameters permit establishing a direct causal relationship between external financing to food security, agriculture and nutrition, on one hand, and the food security figures indicated in the GRFC, on the other. On this topic, therefore, the analysis is more descriptive than causal.
- There is currently little data on OCHA's FTS and OECD's CRS containing subnational information on where external financing is targeted. It was therefore not always possible to identify where assistance was directed geographically beyond the country level

(e.g. targeting refugee crises⁸ or localized food crises).⁹ For what concerns international humanitarian assistance, the data was extracted specifically for the concerned populations, whenever possible. In regard to official development assistance, it is important to note that the assistance reported might not target the specific areas that face a food crisis, according to the available food security analysis. For this reason, official development assistance to countries characterized by refugee crises was included in the aggregate figures presented in the global overview, however it was not taken into account in developing countries' classifications or specific analyses.

- For some projects coded geographically as regional or global, it is not possible to determine if any official development assistance directed to these projects ultimately benefits one or more of the countries of analysis. These flows are, therefore, excluded from the analysis.
- Since resource partners do not necessarily coordinate their reporting to OCHA's FTS and OECD's CRS, it is possible that double-counting and misreporting occurred. For example, an activity reported to the FTS could appear in the CRS under a non-humanitarian purpose code. This could lead to double counting of aid. For this reason, the authors checked sample data from a number of countries to ascertain that this type of misreporting is not prevalent in the data. Moreover, it is also important to note that the OECD DAC governs the rules/reporting of the CRS, while Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) governs the rules/reporting of the FTS.


⁸ e.g. the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh, Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, or Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey.

⁹ Including: Angola (24 communes in three provinces), Cameroon (seven regions), El Salvador (eastern region), Ethiopia (selected areas in six regions), Honduras (13 departments), Madagascar (southern, south-eastern and eastern areas), Mozambique (39 districts), Nigeria (16 states and federal capital territory), Pakistan (Balochistan and Sindh drought-affected areas), United Republic of Tanzania (16 districts), Zambia (86 districts).



Box 1 – Geographical coverage

The analysis cover 54 countries in food crisis, as defined by the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises.¹⁰



¹⁰ See footnote 1



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Box 2 – Glossary of terms

In the context of this note these commonly used terms were applied in the following way.

External Financing: the sum of data extracted from the OECD’s CRS on official development assistance (excluding data reported as humanitarian assistance), and data from OCHA’s FTS on international humanitarian assistance allocated to the food sectors.

Food crisis: a country or territory requiring external assistance to address acute food insecurity and malnutrition in response to a specific shock.¹¹

Food sectors: the three sectors of the analysis – food security, agriculture and nutrition. Depending on the type of aid that’s being analyzed, food-related assistance to these sectors may appear in graphs and tables as these three pillars or as a number of more specific subsectors.

International humanitarian assistance: commitments and paid contributions for humanitarian action spent outside the donor country as reported to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) – including commitments and paid contributions from non-official donors (e.g. private donors) – and allocated to the sectors of food security, agriculture and nutrition. FTS data has been crosschecked against official development assistance from the OECD’s CRS to avoid duplications.

Major food crisis:¹² a country that meets any or all of the following conditions: at least 20 percent of the population are experiencing *Crisis* Phase 3 or above conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above); at least 1 million people are experiencing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above; any area in the country is experiencing *Emergency* or above conditions (IPC/CH Phase 4 and 5) ; the country is included in the humanitarian system-wide emergency response of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

Official development assistance: the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines Official Development Assistance as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of official development assistance recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are provided by official agencies and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and are concessional in character”. Only Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes strictly related to the sectors of analysis (food security, agriculture, and nutrition) were used, including agriculture, basic nutrition, development food assistance, fisheries, forestry, household food security, and school feeding.¹³ Data reported as humanitarian assistance has been excluded for the purposes of this report and the data has been crosschecked against the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of OCHA to avoid duplications.

The ten worst food crises:¹⁴ the top ten countries by number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, as per the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises.

¹¹ The 2020 Global Report on Food Crises provides more details on the selection methodology: FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020: Joint analysis for better decisions. Rome, FSIN. P. 13 Available at <https://www.fsinplatform.org/report/global-report-food-crises-2020/>.

¹² The 35 major food crises are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

¹³ CRS purpose codes and voluntary budget identifier codes used were: (311) Agriculture, (31110) Agricultural policy and administrative management, (31120) Agricultural development, (31130) Agricultural land resources, (31140) Agricultural water resources, (31150) Agricultural inputs, (31161) Food crop production, (31162) Industrial crops/export crops, (31163) Livestock, (31164) Agrarian reform, (31165) Agricultural alternative development, (31166) Agricultural extension, (31181) Agricultural education/training, (31182) Agricultural research, (31191) Agricultural services, (31192) Plant and post-harvest protection and pest control, (31193) Agricultural financial services, (31194) Agricultural co-operatives, (31195) Livestock/veterinary services, (312) Forestry, (31210) Forestry policy and administrative management, (31220) Forestry development, (31261) Fuelwood/charcoal, (31281) Forestry education/training, (31282) Forestry research, (31291) Forestry services, (313) Fishing, (31310) Fishing policy and administrative management, (31320) Fishery development, (31381) Fishery education/training, (31382) Fishery research, (31391) Fishery services, (52010) Development Food assistance, (12240) Basic nutrition, (11250) School feeding, (43071) Food security policy and administrative management, (43072) Household food security programmes, (43073) Food safety and quality.

¹⁴ The ten worst food crises are: Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Ethiopia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, Nigeria, Haiti.





Box 3 – Assessing impacts of COVID-19 on financing flows

The September update of the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises indicated that a range of 101-104.6 million people across 27 countries were classified in Crisis or worse conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), according to analyses carried out between March and September 2020, reflecting the peak situation in times of COVID-19 in many parts of the world. In addition, the analysis showed that in 20 out of 27 countries, around 130.5 million people were classified in *Stressed* conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2). Although there are comparability challenges, it is worth noting that the same 27 countries in 2019 had around 97.6 million people classified in *Crisis* or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).¹⁵

Throughout 2020, conflict has continued to drive displacement and had a devastating impact upon their people's livelihoods. Currency devaluation and escalating food prices, meanwhile, have curtailed food access, and flooding, dry spells and desert locusts have threatened food availability and access.¹⁶ Evidence from the food security analyses in the September update of the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises shows that the pandemic has had a compounding effect on these pre-existing and ongoing drivers. Declining economic activity related to COVID-19 restrictions, in particular, have led to income losses and reduced household purchasing power.¹⁷

It appears that the global pandemic has led several donors and aid providers to re-orient their development projects and budgets towards COVID-19-related efforts. This means that responses to the pandemic involve the reallocation of previously agreed funds (i.e. 2020 budgetary allocations) and the refocusing of existing projects and instruments.¹⁸ Moreover, it appears that, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, multilateral organizations, and especially United Nations entities, have activated bodies and mechanisms to mobilize global response to the crisis. Bilateral, multilateral and private organizations are increasing their engagement with each other to provide emergency health and humanitarian responses to the COVID-19 crisis.¹⁹ Due to their role as coordinating actors in the response to the pandemic and in collating related information from across the world, multilateral organizations have called for increased financing to scale up their urgent work.

In terms of funding allocations, it is not yet possible to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on official development assistance earmarked for food security, agriculture, and nutrition. According to projections,²⁰ however, total official development assistance may fall from 2019 levels of USD 153 billion to, at best, USD 143 billion in 2020. The same best-case projections suggest official development assistance may recover to USD 149 billion in 2021. At worst, total official development assistance may fall to USD 139 billion in 2020 and shrink further to USD 134 billion in 2021 – a 12 percent reduction from 2019 levels. Moreover, the projected reductions in official development assistance are likely to severely affect countries that already face humanitarian crisis.²¹ Another indicator to consider is the funding to the COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP).²² As of 17 November 2020, the response requirements of the GHRP amounted to USD 9.5 billion, with around USD 3.6 billion funded (38 percent).

This preliminary decline in food security, in combination with the projected reductions in official development assistance and the knock-on effects of COVID-19 on various drivers of hunger, could result in even higher levels of acute food insecurity and reverse the development gains of recent years. There is a need to reinforce these gains and to accelerate positive structural transformations during the recovery period.²³

¹⁵ FSIN & GNFC. 2020. September Update of the Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome, FSIN. Available [here](#)

¹⁶ Global Network Against Food Crises. 2020. Technical note "Food crises and COVID-19: emerging evidence and implications". Rome. Available [here](#)

¹⁷ FSIN & GNFC. 2020. September Update of the Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome, FSIN. Available [here](#)

¹⁸ OECD. 2020. Development Co-operation Report 2020: Learning from Crises, Building Resilience. Paris, OECD Available [here](#)

¹⁹ OECD. 2020. COVID-19 Survey – Main Findings. Paris, OECD Available [here](#)

²⁰ Development Initiatives. 2020. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. These projections are based on economic forecasts made in June 2020 by OECD of three pandemic scenarios (a short outbreak, a longer outbreak and a second outbreak).

²¹ Development Initiatives. 2020.

²² The GHRP is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) initiative to address the risks and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the most vulnerable people in countries affected by humanitarian crises or at high risk of facing a humanitarian disaster.

²³ OECD. 2020. COVID-19 Survey – Main Findings. Paris, OECD Available [here](#)

Overview of food-sectors external financing for food crises



Food crises absorb a significant share of external financing to food sectors

Out of the total humanitarian and development assistance to food sectors worldwide, the 54 food crises received 97% of the international humanitarian assistance (four-year average 2016-2019) and 54% of the official development assistance (three-year average 2016-2018).



In food crisis contexts, external financing to food sectors represent a significant share of overall international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance

Within the 54 food crises, 30% of the total humanitarian assistance was allocated to food sectors against 10 percent of total development assistance.*



Food crises are a humanitarian issue

More than half of the external financing spent on food security, agriculture and nutrition in food crises was humanitarian. Plus, food crises absorb nearly all food-related international humanitarian assistance (97%).



Food crises are a development issue

Food crises are protracted in nature. In 2020, 19 out of 54 food crises (35%) are facing a protracted crisis situation with detrimental longer-term development impacts.**



Food crises are a fragility issue

Today, 44 out of 54 food crises, representing 95% of the people in acute food insecurity, are in countries on the 2020 OECD states of fragility list. Of the 10 worst food crises, 7 are in states defined as “extremely fragile”***


* The remaining 70 percent of humanitarian assistance and 90 percent of development assistance are allocated to other sectors and are not in the scope of this analysis.

** According to the 2017 State of Food and Nutrition Security in the World report, protracted crises are “characterized by recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, longevity of food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crises.”

*** OECD. 2020. States of Fragility 2020. Paris. Available [here](#). Fragility is defined by OECD as a “combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of a state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes, including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises, or other emergencies”.

Food-sectors external financing for food crises in numbers

Figure 1: Trend of external financing for food crises in USD 2016 – 2019*




* Official development assistance data from the CRS disaggregated by country is only available up to 2018.

Levels of acute food insecurity

Figure 2: Number of people in acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) as per the four editions of the Global Report on Food Crises

Million people in IPC/CH phase 3 and above



Matching the needs – International humanitarian assistance and acute food insecurity



Globally, international humanitarian assistance to food sectors increased the growing trend in acute food insecurity, with increased allocations across the four years of analysis. However, allocations are not keeping pace with the growing population in need of assistance. Nevertheless, over the past four years, international humanitarian assistance has increased in real and relative terms, while official development assistance fell as an overall percentage of external financing.



- ▶ Between 2016-2019, **international humanitarian assistance to food sectors increased by 23 percent**

From USD **6.3** to **7.8** billion



- ▶ While the **people in need of urgent action** increased by **35 percent**

From **108** to **135** million people



- ▶ And the **international humanitarian assistance to food sectors per person** in acute food insecurity **slightly reduced**

From USD **58** to **57** per capita

Takeaway

In food crisis contexts, international humanitarian assistance plays an important role, especially in countries where development financing is limited. Evidence, however, shows that international humanitarian assistance alone does not necessarily keep pace with growing population in need of assistance. Given the long-term nature of these crises and the fragility of such contexts, the analysis of international humanitarian assistance and levels of acute food insecurity suggests that, where appropriate, sustained levels of official development assistance would be necessary to address the structural causes of hunger and to reduce needs over time. A 'nexus approach' in food crisis contexts can help greatly in ensuring all dimensions of international support together produce more sustainable food security outcomes. Such coordinated linkages allow international humanitarian assistance to address rising levels of hunger and malnutrition, while official development assistance is layered or sequenced to strengthen food systems in ways that address the underlying drivers of food insecurity.

According to the four editions of the Global Report on Food Crises, the number of people facing acute food insecurity between 2016 and 2019 consistently exceeded 100 million (Figure 2). In 2019, the number of food-insecure people reached the highest levels, when about 135 million people were facing *Crisis* conditions or worse of food insecurity, according to the Integrated Phase Classification and *Cadre Harmonisé* analyses. There were diverse drivers for this increase in food insecurity: worsening conflict and insecurity in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Cameroon; severe drought and other climate extreme (including tropical cyclones in Southern Africa, Guatemala, and Pakistan); economic shocks (for

instance, in Haiti and Zimbabwe); as well as displacement crises originating from countries that experience conflict or economic shocks.²⁴

During the four-year period from 2016 to 2019, both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance directed to food sectors witnessed an increase, but international humanitarian assistance increased faster than allocations to development.

²⁴ The increasing number of food-insecure people in need of urgent assistance is also the result of a greater geographical coverage in the editions of the GRFC over the years of analysis.

- International humanitarian assistance to food sectors increased by 23 percent between 2016 and 2019, while official development assistance to food sectors witnessed a modest growth of 4 percent between 2016 and 2018 (Figure 1).
- In particular, international humanitarian assistance to food sectors has increased by USD 1.1 billion between 2016 and 2018 – from USD 6.3 billion to USD 7.4 billion– with an average annual increase of 7 percent. In comparison, official development assistance to food sectors increased only by USD 233 million over the same period – from USD 6.4 billion to USD 6.6 billion– with an average annual increase of 2 percent (Figure 1).
- However, despite the increase in absolute terms, international humanitarian assistance did not seem to keep pace with the growing population in acute food insecurity. Between 2016 and 2019, the international humanitarian assistance per person in acute food insecurity has slightly reduced (from USD 58 per capita to USD 57 per capita).

Matching the needs – International humanitarian assistance and acute food insecurity



Distribution of international humanitarian assistance between food crisis countries is disproportionate and aid is not necessarily allocated according to acute food security needs.



- ▶ The **three top crises in 2019** – Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan – represented

One third of all people in acute food insecurity



- ▶ Between 2016-2019, these three countries received on average

Yemen	DRC	Afghanistan
19 percent	4 percent	2 percent
of total international humanitarian assistance (USD 5.3 bln)	of total international humanitarian assistance (USD 1.0 bln)	of total international humanitarian assistance (USD 0.6 bln)

Takeaway


Evidence shows that some food crises remain underfunded, unfunded, or forgotten, despite needs. Recognizing that financing decisions are based on a combination of factors, stronger coordination and evidence-based advocacy is needed to support more equitable and needs-based allocation of resources, including more attention to the so-called forgotten food crises. To ensure no country is left behind in achieving the zero-hunger objective, more communication and transparency is needed among the international community about division of labour and funding intentions.²⁵ Moreover, in line with the Grand Bargain commitments, partners should increase the use of un-earmarked funding, thus promoting needs-based allocation.

²⁵ OECD. 2015. Financing in Crisis? Making humanitarian assistance fit for the future. *OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers*. No 22. June. Paris. Available [here](#).

The graph below (Figure 3) presents a simple correlation between the 2019 allocation of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors and the number of people in acute food insecurity in each country for the same year. The analysis showed a positive correlation – but not necessarily a causal relationship – between international humanitarian assistance and levels of acute insecurity suggesting that allocations of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors increase in relation to an increase in number of people in acute food insecurity. However, the graph shows how the distribution of international humanitarian assistance between food crisis countries is disproportionate and assistance is not necessarily allocated according to acute food security needs. For instance, Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have similar number of people in acute food insecurity in 2019 (15.9 and 15.6 million respectively) – presented in the horizontal

axis, but the two countries present great disparity in terms of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors the same year (USD 1.9 billion and USD 370 million respectively) – presented in the vertical axis. Another example is the position of Afghanistan and the Sudan. These two countries have a similar allocation of international humanitarian assistance (USD 180 million and USD 198 million respectively), with very different acute food insecurity levels (11.3 million people in acute food insecurity in Afghanistan, and 5.9 million in the Sudan). Another interesting example is the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, where despite the high levels of acute food insecurity in 2019 (9.3 million people) had one of the lowest allocations of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors in the same year (USD 8.6 million). However, it has to be acknowledged that in absence of estimates of operational costs, these differences cannot be further interpreted.

Figure 3: Correlation between 2019 international humanitarian assistance (USD millions) to food sectors and number of people in acute food insecurity (millions)




The correlation presented above was instrumental to visualize countries that have different levels of funding despite similar levels of acute food insecurity. Based on this, further analysis was conducted for specific countries in terms of differences of allocation of international humanitarian assistance to food sectors. The section below presents three set of countries with similar levels

of acute food insecurity and pinpoints the disproportions in allocation of international humanitarian assistance between them. The analysis looks at international humanitarian assistance to food sector (average 2016-2019 USD amounts) per person in acute food insecurity (average 2016-2019 levels). By looking at their levels of humanitarian funding per person in acute food

insecurity, the analysis reinforces the finding that there is a disproportional allocation of humanitarian assistance compared to the levels of need and offers additional highlights to better understand the scale of the issue.


Figure 4: International humanitarian assistance (USD) to food sectors per person in acute food insecurity (per capita analysis) – 2016-2019 average.



- In 2019, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Yemen were the three largest food crises, accounting for around one-third (32 percent) of people in urgent need of assistance. Yemen had 15.9 million people in urgent need, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 15.6 million people and Afghanistan 11.3 million people.²⁶
- By analysing the average international humanitarian assistance per person in acute food insecurity (per capita) over the four years (2016-2019), the disparity in allocation becomes clear. In Yemen, the average international humanitarian assistance per capita was USD 84, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo USD 24, and in Afghanistan USD 16 (Figure 4). This means that – on average – one food insecure person in Yemen received 3.5 times the international humanitarian assistance of a person in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 5 times of one in Afghanistan. However, the analysis does not take into consideration the different operational costs that might increase or decrease humanitarian allocations according to specific logistic needs and access constraints.
- In absolute terms, those countries received on average 19 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent of total international humanitarian assistance to food sectors (cumulative 2016-2019), respectively. By looking at the cumulative food-related international

humanitarian assistance, the disparity in allocation is also clear. Yemen received USD 5.3 billion, or five times more than the USD 1.0 billion allocated to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and almost eight times more than Afghanistan, which received close to USD 650 million.

Figure 5: International humanitarian assistance (USD) to food sectors per person in acute food insecurity (per capita analysis) – 2016-2019 average.




- A similar trend appears in analyzing four other countries in the top ten worst food crises in 2019, namely the Syrian Arab Republic (6.6 million people in acute food insecurity), South Sudan (7 million people in acute food insecurity), the Sudan (5.9 million people in acute food insecurity) and Nigeria (5 million people in acute food insecurity).²⁷
- In the Syrian Arab Republic and South Sudan, the average international humanitarian assistance per person in acute food insecurity (per capita) over the four years (2016-2019), was USD 119, in Nigeria USD 54, and in Sudan USD 47 (Figure 5). Nigeria and Sudan received on average less than half of the per capita amount of international humanitarian assistance received by one person in the Syrian Arab Republic or South Sudan.
- In absolute terms, the cumulative food-related international humanitarian assistance for 2016 to 2019 for the four countries was as followed: the Syrian Arab Republic and South Sudan received the largest amounts, with USD 3.2 and USD 2.8 billion, respectively. This corresponded to 11 percent and 10 percent of the total international humanitarian assistance to food sectors flowing to food crisis countries. In comparison, the Sudan and Nigeria, which have similar levels of acute food insecurity,

²⁶ FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome, FSIN.

²⁷ FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome, FSIN.

each received around one-third of the amount of international humanitarian assistance that flowed to South Sudan or the Syrian Arab Republic. The Sudan received close to USD 915 million between 2016 and 2019 (3 percent of total international humanitarian assistance for food crises), and Nigeria USD 1.3 billion (5 percent of total international humanitarian assistance).

- **Figure 6: International humanitarian assistance (USD) to food sectors per person in acute food insecurity (per capita analysis) – 2016-2019 average.**



- In Zimbabwe, the average international humanitarian assistance per person in acute food insecurity (per capita) over the four years (2016-2019), was USD 32, in Haiti USD 26, and in Malawi USD 11 (Figure 6).
- In absolute terms, with close to USD 450 million, Zimbabwe received two times the humanitarian allocation to food sectors of the other two countries (or 2 percent of total international humanitarian assistance). Haiti received USD 220 million and Malawi USD 230 million (each representing 1 percent of the total international humanitarian assistance allocated to food crisis countries).

- Similarly, Haiti, Malawi and Zimbabwe received uneven allocations of international humanitarian assistance, regardless of having comparable numbers of people living in acute food insecurity: Haiti had 3.7 million people in acute food insecurity, Zimbabwe 3.6 million people, and Malawi 3.3 million people.



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
Box 4 – Food security and nutrition sectors in the humanitarian appeals (2016 – 2019)

In 2019, the volume of international humanitarian assistance requested for the food security and nutrition sectors through the Global Humanitarian Appeals process grew for the fourth consecutive year, reaching a new high – USD 10.7 billion. At the same time, the funding gap steadily decreased to 36 percent in 2019, down from 46 percent in 2016.

The Global Humanitarian Overview, together with the country-level Humanitarian Response Plans and Regional Plans, is coordinated by OCHA and seeks to provide a strategic approach to coordinating the planning, funding, implementation and monitoring of humanitarian action. Through this process, humanitarian actors come together to identify and prioritize humanitarian needs in major crises, noting likely scenarios in the future 12-month period, which are published in the Humanitarian Needs Overview, and based on this, UN agencies and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) proposed assistance and funding requirements are prioritized and consolidated in the Humanitarian Response Plan or Regional Response Plan. Between 2016 and 2019, humanitarian requirements rose by 50 percent, while funding for food security and nutrition clusters increased by 70 percent in UN-coordinated appeals and response plans.

- In the 37 countries with food crisis situations covered by an UN-coordinated response plan or appeal,²⁸ the total requirements of the food security and nutrition clusters increased from USD 7.2 billion in 2016 to USD 10.7 billion in 2019.
- In the same countries, during the same period, the total number of people in IPC phase 3 and above increased by 42 percent.
- Despite increasing food security needs, allocations to UN-coordinated appeals have responded by a 70-percent increase in funding to the food security and nutrition clusters for those countries, from USD 3.9 billion in 2016 to USD 6.9 billion in 2019.
- Concerted efforts helped reduce the gap between needs and allocations from 46 percent gap in 2016 to 36 percent in 2019.

Figure 7: Aggregate funding and requirements for food security and nutrition clusters to 37 food crisis countries targeted by UN-coordinated response plans or appeals in 2016–2019²⁹



²⁸ Funding and requirements for the food security and nutrition clusters were aggregated for each appeal with those two distinct clusters to calculate the percentage of funding requirements met. The 37 food crisis countries covered by UN-coordinated response plans or appeals in 2016-2019 are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. This does not include the Regional Refugee Response Plans coordinated by UNHCR in 2019 (i.e. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and South Sudan) with the exception of the Syria 3RP, which is included in the analysis for the country components of Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq.

²⁹ Data reflects aggregate funding and requirements for the food security and nutrition clusters. This covers 41 appeals over 2016-2019, for 37 out of the 54 food crises for those years in which they faced an appeal that is tracked on FTS, or in the case of the Syria 3RP country components, by UNHCR.



Searching for the right balance of external financing – international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance for countries with food crisis



The amounts of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to countries with food crisis situations differ widely.

This may be due to imbalances or to context-specific factors, including the root causes of the food crisis and the security situation. In general, food crises – with a protracted nature – receive a limited proportion of official development assistance compared with humanitarian allocations to their food sectors. This is the case even though the majority of these crises are protracted in nature.



► **Ten** out of the 35 **major food crises** received more than

60 percent of their external financing as international humanitarian assistance even though **eight of them** are protracted crises



► **Nineteen** countries received between

20-40 percent of their external financing as international humanitarian assistance



► **Six** countries received less than

20 percent of their external financing as international humanitarian assistance

Takeaway


In food crisis contexts, there is a comparatively high proportion of humanitarian spending. Similarly to the previous finding, the analysis points to the need of ensuring that, wherever possible, development investments are made and sustained to address the structural issues of affected and vulnerable agriculture and food based livelihoods and related food systems and to reduce humanitarian needs over time. External financing is most effective when it goes hand in hand with a policy environment that ensures such risk-informed investments have the widest possible impact on long-term food security, which is not always the case for most of the countries that experience protracted food crises.



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Figure 8: Balance (%) of cumulative (2016-2018) international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors for the 35 major food crises

● Total international humanitarian assistance ● Total official development assistance





Box 5 – What do we mean by protracted crises?

According to the 2017 State of Food and Nutrition Security in the World report, protracted crises are “characterized by recurrent natural disasters and/ or conflict, longevity of food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crises.” More specifically, to establish that a country is experiencing a protracted crisis, it needs to meet three criteria:

- **Longevity of the crisis:** the country has faced a shock – either natural or human-induced – for four consecutive years between 2016 and 2019, or for eight out of ten years between 2010 and 2019, and it is listed among the countries requiring external assistance for food;
- **Humanitarian aid flow to the country:** the country received more than 10 percent of total external financing in the form of international humanitarian assistance between 2009 and 2017; and
- **Economic and food security status of the country:** the country is among the low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs), as defined by FAO in 2018.

In 2020, 22 countries met the above three criteria: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Zimbabwe. All of them were also affected by food crises in 2019, although no data were available for acute food insecurity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti and Eritrea. Among these 22 countries, 16 were also defined as major food crises, namely: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Zimbabwe.


Sources: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2020. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020. Transforming food systems for affordable healthy diets.* Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9692en>; FSIN & GNFC. 2020. *Global Report on Food Crises 2020.* Rome, FSIN.

- By looking at the average share of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance over 2016-2018, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen received a limited share of official development assistance (less than 40 percent) compared to the international humanitarian allocations over the same three years. Of these ten countries, all except for Iraq and Palestine³⁰ are considered protracted crises (Box 4).
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen, showed a growing trend in allocations to food-related official development assistance over the three years, but the share of international humanitarian assistance remains significantly larger.
- Nineteen major food crises have a share of official development assistance to food sectors between 60 and 80 percent of total external financing. Among them, six are defined as protracted crises (Box 5). Even if international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance are very different in absolute terms, the share of official development assistance is substantial, indicating that efforts have been taken to solve some of the structural issues of local food systems.
- Six major food crises received more than 80 percent of official development assistance as a share of total external financing. None of these countries appear in the list of protracted crises, but all of them are characterized by acute food insecurity, mostly driven by climate variability and extremes, and somehow stable political conditions conducive for long-term development investments.


³⁰ FAO did not consider Iraq a low-income food-deficit country in 2018; Palestine as a territory is not considered in the list of countries requiring external assistance for food as issued by FAO-GIEWs and it is not in the list of LIFDCs.

Figure 9: The ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors (sum of yearly development – 2016–2018 – and humanitarian – 2016–2019 – assistance)

International humanitarian assistance (2016–2019)
(USD billions)



Official development assistance (2016–2018)
(USD billions)



- The five largest recipient countries of official development assistance between 2016 and 2018 (excluding countries characterised by refugee population in food crisis) were Ethiopia (USD 2.1 billion), Afghanistan (USD 897 million), Nigeria (USD 782 million), United Republic of Tanzania (USD 711 million), and Kenya (USD 703 million). These five countries account for almost 30-percent of the total official development assistance to food crises between 2016 and 2018 (Figure 9).
- The five largest recipient countries of international humanitarian assistance between 2016 and 2019 (excluding countries characterised by refugee population in food crisis) were Yemen (USD 5.3 billion), the Syrian Arab Republic (USD 3.2 billion), South Sudan (USD 2.8 billion), Ethiopia (USD 2.5 billion) and Somalia (USD 1.9 billion). These five countries account for 55 percent of the total international humanitarian assistance to food crises between 2016 and 2019 (Figure 9).
- When looking at the top ten recipients of official development assistance and international humanitarian assistance, there are only three countries that appear on both lists: Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. This suggests the need to strengthen approaches that link humanitarian, development and peace objectives and to ensure that longer-term risk-sensitive development and sustaining peace financing are provided also in contexts that receive high levels of humanitarian assistance to reduce needs over time.

A look at the ten worst food crises: tackling the growing trend of acute hunger



The ten worst food crises absorb a relative bigger share of humanitarian finance than of official development assistance for food sectors. This may be due to imbalances or to context-specific factors.

The worst ten food crises:



► Represent

65 percent of acute food insecurity needs



► Receive

62 percent of the total international humanitarian assistance to food crises



► And absorb


31 percent of all food-related official development assistance to food crises

Takeaway


International humanitarian assistance allocations reflect the concentration of acute food insecurity levels in the ten worst food crises, however, official development assistance constitutes a relatively lower share of total external financing in the same countries. Structural changes in the aid architecture are needed to address this trend so that international humanitarian assistance can be reduced over time through longer-term risk-informed development investments that tackle the structural root causes of crisis and hunger.

Figure 10: Distribution of external financing by category of food crisis

International humanitarian assistance



Official development assistance




- On average, 62 percent of the total food-related international humanitarian assistance was directed to the ten worst food crises, which accounted for 65 percent of total acute food insecurity needs. Moreover, they received 31 percent of all food-related official development assistance.
- The increase in food-related international humanitarian assistance between 2016 and 2019 described in the section above was mostly allocated

to the ten worst food crises, suggesting an increased concentration of international humanitarian assistance to these ten countries. These countries also received the majority of the increase in official development assistance between 2016 and 2018. This is encouraging as it suggests that there may be opportunities to strengthen nexus-approaches and better link short-term humanitarian with long-term development objectives.



Figure 11: Balance (%) and amounts (USD millions) of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance by year for the ten major food crises

● Total international humanitarian assistance ● Total official development assistance ● Number of people in acute food insecurity (million)



- The amount of food-related international humanitarian assistance to these countries, however, was more than twice the amount of official development assistance to their food sectors – in 2018 the amount was USD 4.8 billion compared to USD 2.3 billion, respectively.

A consistent positive correlation was observed between the levels of acute food insecurity and international humanitarian assistance to food sectors in the ten worst food crises. This correlation assumed one-year lag between food security analyses and decisions on allocation of funding by the international community and was conducted in an attempt to assess to what extent patterns in funding followed patterns in hunger.

This could point towards a positive – but definitely not exclusive – effect of advocacy efforts (e.g. IPC/CH analyses and the Global Report on Food Crises) in guiding and shaping humanitarian allocations towards food security and nutrition needs in countries with food crisis situations. In this regard, country-specific trends are outlined in the analysis of the ten worst food crises.

When the shares of official development assistance and international humanitarian assistance are analyzed by year (possible only until 2018) and compared to acute food insecurity, the determinants of financial allocation seem to be highly context specific. Below, an analysis by year is presented for the ten worst food crises.

- In Yemen, some 90 percent of the assistance received for its food sectors in 2018 was in the form of international humanitarian assistance. This significantly higher proportion of humanitarian over development allocations reflected the high prevalence of acute food insecurity needs that year and the year before – the population in acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) was around 60 percent in 2017 and 53 percent in 2018 with significant numbers of population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). This was followed, indeed, by increased humanitarian efforts, with international humanitarian assistance growing by 211 percent between 2016 and 2019. Despite the long duration of the crisis, the Yemen context is characterized by active conflict that affects the ability to make development investments.
- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the population in acute food insecurity increased by

122 percent between 2016 and 2018. Mirroring this trend, international humanitarian assistance increased by 162 percent and official development assistance by 91 percent. Humanitarian allocations have increased as a proportion of overall external financing from around 58 percent in 2016 to around 65 percent in 2018, while official development assistance allocations have gone from 42 percent to 35 percent (Figure 10). The decreasing proportion of development funding is in contrast with the long-term crisis and fragility the country is experiencing.

- In Afghanistan, acute food insecurity levels have increased up to 25 percent between 2016 and 2018. This trend is followed by an 80 percent increase of the international humanitarian assistance allocation and up to 30 percent decrease in official development assistance. While this pattern shows that needs are well reflected in humanitarian assistance planning, the levels of allocations suggest that there is significant room to strengthen approaches that integrate humanitarian, development and peace objectives in the country, given the multi-risk drivers and protracted nature of its crisis.
- In Ethiopia, the decreasing trend in acute food insecurity (down 18 percent between 2016 and 2019) was followed by a decrease of international humanitarian assistance (down 50 percent)³¹. The country received a similar proportion of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors during the years for which development data was available. In 2018, international humanitarian assistance to food sectors in Ethiopia was 41 percent of total food-related external financing, while official development assistance represented the remaining 59 percent (see Figure 10 and 9, which shows Ethiopia among the top ten recipients of both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance). This suggests that significant levels of official development assistance are available to complement humanitarian actions.
- In the Syrian Arab Republic, the slight decrease (down 6 percent) in acute food insecurity levels was followed

³¹ In the time of publishing, conflict broke out in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. The conflict and related displacement is likely to have aggravated the acute food insecurity situation in early 2021 with potential repercussions on humanitarian allocations.

by a slight decrease in international humanitarian assistance (down 11 percent). The country, however, received almost all of its external financing as humanitarian assistance – 97 percent out of the total in 2018. This may reflect the challenges in the allocation of official development assistance due to the nature of the crisis and sensitivities in providing development assistance in line with government priorities.

- In the Sudan, acute food security levels increased up to 40 percent between 2016 and 2018. At the same time, an increase in official development assistance was observed, whereas international humanitarian assistance has been decreasing. This made the combination of assistance the country received increasingly balanced. This created an opportunity to improve coordination between the two types of assistance.
- In South Sudan, following the 43-percent increase in acute food insecurity, both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance have been growing. In 2018, official development assistance was 28 percent of the total external financing, from 14 percent in 2016. This may indicate that there are increased investments in development programming to address the drivers of food insecurity and hunger in the South Sudanese context. At the same time, the great amount of international humanitarian assistance reflects the attempts made to avert localized famine in 2017.
- In Nigeria, despite the overall improvement in food security outcomes between 2016 and 2018 (a 35-percent decrease in people living in acute food insecurity in the 16 states and the Federal Capital Territory analyzed), the situation remained dire and showed little improvement in the north-eastern conflict-affected areas. International humanitarian assistance sharply increased in 2017 (220 percent increase from 2016 levels) reflecting the massive efforts made by humanitarian organizations and the government in the north-eastern States to prevent famine.
- In Haiti, acute food insecurity levels increased significantly between 2016 and 2018 (up 53 percent), followed surprisingly by a drastic decrease in international humanitarian assistance (down 62 percent between 2016 and 2018) and by an increase of official development assistance (up 25 percent between 2016 and 2018). The country received 84 percent of the total external financing to food sectors in official development assistance and 16 percent in international humanitarian assistance in 2018.



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- In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, between 2016 and 2017 no international humanitarian assistance to food sectors of interest was recorded. At the same time, the country had small allocations of official development assistance (on average USD 2 million per year). Starting from 2018, the country has witnessed a rapid increase of international humanitarian allocations in response to the migrant and refugee crisis, from almost USD 4 million in 2018 to USD 8.6 million in 2019. Through these additional funds, the country started receiving a balanced allocation of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance in 2018 (Figure 10).

Drivers of acute food insecurity and trends in external financing to food sectors



Food crises characterized by conflict or insecurity as primary driver of acute food insecurity (even if combining other risks of disasters and crisis such as climate variability and extremes, or economic shocks) draw the largest shares of both international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance.



- ▶ Food crisis countries primarily affected by **conflict and insecurity** received on average

72 percent of all food-related international humanitarian assistance and **49 percent** of all food-related official development assistance



- ▶ Food crisis countries primarily affected by **climate variability and extremes** received on average


23 percent of all food-related international humanitarian assistance and **43 percent** of all food-related official development assistance

Takeaway


Conflict and insecurity are the major drivers behind acute food insecurity (Box 6), often aggravated by the growing impact of climate change with its suite of climate extreme and slow onset events, as well as other risks and impacts from socio-economic shocks and food chain threats. Increased long-term financing to countries affected by conflict is a positive trend, especially since data shows such development investments have been maintained even in conflict contexts with rising humanitarian needs. That said, there is a need to accompany such financing with structural changes in the way investments are made and to better coordinate linkages between humanitarian, development and peace interventions to improve the resilience of affected, vulnerable and at risk populations. This would include consistent use of conflict and climate analyses to inform programme design, the insertion of crisis modifiers in programme cycles, and an increased flexibility and stability of such funding. Food crises mainly characterized by climate extreme and slow onset events, on the other hand, present more recurrent acute patterns of disasters affecting their development trajectories. Anchored in governments' and communities capacities to manage multiple risk and disasters, investments in these countries should be risk-proofed focusing on disaster risk reduction and management, climate change adaptation, nature-based solutions, and include a combination of disaster and climate risk interventions. These may include risk monitoring and early warning mechanisms, anticipatory actions, risk-informed and shock responsive social protection, and emergency preparedness and response linked to blended allocations from humanitarian, development and domestic financing.

Figure 12: Share (%) of international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors in food crisis contexts by primary driver³² in 2016-2019

International humanitarian assistance



Official development assistance



³² The analysis was made using the primary driver of acute food insecurity as stated in the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises: FSIN & GNFC. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. Rome, FSIN.

- Countries where conflict or insecurity was the primary driver of a food crisis saw the largest share of global international humanitarian assistance to food sectors between 2016 and 2019. What's more, that share of assistance increased from 63 percent to 76 percent over the same period.
- In absolute numbers, international humanitarian assistance for food-sectors to these countries has also significantly and consistently increased – from USD 4.0 billion in 2016 to USD 5.9 billion in 2019.
- Among the top ten largest recipients of food-related international humanitarian assistance between 2016 and 2019,³³ the majority are countries with conflict or insecurity as the primary driver of acute food insecurity.
- These countries also accounted for around 49 percent of the official development assistance to food sectors, which remained stable between 2016 and 2018. In absolute numbers, however, the development allocations to conflict- and insecurity-affected countries slightly increased – from USD 3.1 billion in 2016 to USD 3.3 billion in 2018.
- Countries affected primarily by climate variability and extremes also received a stable share of official development assistance to food sectors between 2016 and 2018 (slightly more than 40 percent, or some USD 2.8 billion). Still, the share of international humanitarian assistance directed to these countries has significantly shrunk over the years. In 2016, it represented around 28 percent, or USD 1.8 billion, while in 2019, it had decreased to 18 percent, or USD 1.4 billion, of the total international humanitarian assistance allocated to countries with food crisis.
- The top ten largest recipients of food-related official development assistance between 2016 and 2018³⁴ were almost equally split between countries in which climate variability and extremes are the primary driver of food insecurity and countries where the main driver is conflict or insecurity.
- Even though a lower number of countries experienced food crises that were primarily driven by economic shocks (seven countries in 2019), these countries nevertheless received a significant proportion of the total external financing (both humanitarian and development) earmarked for food security, nutrition and agriculture. International humanitarian assistance to these countries decreased between 2016 and 2019, from 9 percent to 6 percent, or from close to USD 600 million to almost

³³ The top ten for humanitarian assistance were in order of severity: Yemen, Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Afghanistan and Chad.

³⁴ The top ten for development assistance were: Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Pakistan, Mozambique, and the Niger.

USD 500 million. The trend in official development assistance is the opposite, with a slight increase from USD 491 million to USD 579 million between 2016

and 2018, or from 8 to 9 percent of the total official development assistance to food crisis countries.




Box 6 – Drivers of acute food insecurity (GRFC 2020)

Conflict or insecurity were the main driver of food crises in 2019. That said, climate variability and extremes, and economic shocks also became increasingly significant that year. Over half of the 77 million acutely food-insecure people in countries where conflict was the primary driver were living in the Near East and Asia. Regional crises continued to see high levels of acute food insecurity, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin and the central Sahel.


Africa had the largest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in need of assistance in countries badly affected by climate variability and extremes, particularly in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.

Figure 13: Numbers of acutely food insecure people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) (millions) by key drivers



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2020

Figure 14: Official development assistance trend in food crisis countries primarily affected by conflict or insecurity – 2016-2018 (USD millions)



- Official development assistance to food sectors has been growing in countries affected by conflict and insecurity, like Yemen, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between 2016 and 2018. Still, in general, the largest recipients of official development assistance over that period vary significantly, depending on context-specific variables.

The countries receiving the largest proportional increases in official development assistance were Yemen (up 386 percent, from USD 37 million to USD 178 million), South Sudan (up 164 percent, from USD 110 million to USD 291 million), Chad (up 135 percent, from USD 41 million to USD 96 million), and the Democratic Republic of



the Congo (up 91 percent, from USD 100 million to USD 191 million).

- Among the ten largest recipients of official development assistance, six countries had climate

extreme events as primary driver of food insecurity (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan, and United Republic of Tanzania), and four countries had conflict or insecurity as the main driver (Afghanistan, Mali, Nigeria and the Niger).

Channels of delivery for international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors




Takeaway

Evidence underscores the need for a more coherent and coordinated effort by partners strengthening complementarities of interventions across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus for building resilience.³⁵ Although international humanitarian assistance needs to be independent, impartial and needs-based, it should complement development efforts linked to national strategies so that complementarities humanitarian, development and sustaining peace interventions are mutually reinforcing for securing development gains in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

³⁵ OECD. 2020. States of Fragility 2020. Paris. Available [here](#).

Figure 15: Distribution (%) of external financing to food sectors by channel of delivery (average 2016-2019 for international humanitarian assistance and 2016-2018 for official development assistance)



- Not only international humanitarian assistance has been predominantly channelled through UN organizations in all years between 2016 and 2019, there has also been an upward trend: in 2016, UN organizations received 74 percent of the assistance; by 2019, this increased to 82 percent.
- The trend analysis shows that international humanitarian assistance channelled through NGOs has been decreasing over the four years of analysis, from 22 percent of the total in 2016 to 12 percent in 2019.
- Official development assistance continues to be predominantly channelled through national governments in all years. That said, data shows a progressive and significant decrease, from almost 40 percent in 2016 to only 19 percent in 2018. It is worth noting that the years 2016 to 2018 saw an increasing number of data entries without information on channel of delivery – 18 percent of the total in 2018 alone— which may explain this significant reduction.
- The vast majority of official development assistance that was channelled through non-governmental organizations was disbursed through international NGOs and only a small share through NGOs based in the recipient country.



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


Box 7 – Increasing international humanitarian and official development assistance to nutrition

External financing allocated to nutrition has been growing: international humanitarian assistance to nutrition has increased by 70 percent between 2016 and 2019, while official development assistance to nutrition has increased by almost 50 percent between 2016 and 2018.³⁶

- Within international humanitarian assistance, allocations to nutrition increased by 70 percent between 2016 and 2019, from 700 million in 2016 to 1.2 billion in 2019. International humanitarian assistance to food security and agriculture increased in absolute terms, from 5.6 to 6.5 billion, or 16 percent. In relative terms, allocations to these two sectors decreased compared to nutrition, from a combined 89 percent of the total international humanitarian assistance to 84 percent.
- Within official development assistance, allocation to nutrition increased by 50 percent between 2016 and 2018, from 605 million in 2016 to 891 million in 2018. Official development assistance to food security and agriculture decreased in absolute terms, from 5.8 to 5.7 billion, or 1 percent. In relative terms, likewise, allocations to these two sectors decreased compared to nutrition, from a combined 90 percent of the total official development assistance to 87 percent.

Figure 16: International humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to nutrition – 2016-2019 (USD billions)



³⁶ To calculate the total official development assistance allocated to Nutrition, financial flows in CRS coded as “basic nutrition” and “school feeding” were added together.

Concluding remarks

Despite the increase of humanitarian and development financing to food sectors between 2016 and 2019, the number of people in acute food insecurity has also been growing. As such, further efforts need to be made to not only ensure that the level of financing meets growing needs but that it is the right kind of financing, delivered in the right place at the right time, using the most effective mechanisms and approaches. This will involve ensuring that humanitarian and development financing is appropriately layered and sequenced to meet immediate needs while also reducing those needs over time; while also ensuring that financial allocations are made on the basis of comparable and available data to ensure that people's needs are met within and across different contexts in a transparent and equitable manner.

Partners committed to address the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition need to rethink how external financing is delivered and how food crises are handled. The high cost of responding to humanitarian crises and the fact that such crises are diverse in nature, call for strategies that are multi-risk and crafted along the whole food systems, cutting across sectors and institutions. Such approaches that create linkages between humanitarian, development and peace interventions are ultimately best positioned to prevent and reduce future food crises, bolster food systems and save lives and livelihoods in the long term. These multi-risk and system approaches need to be backed-up by appropriate financing across the HDP nexus, as well as by institutional mechanisms promoting the participation of non food-sector actors.

Current efforts to address food crises seems to emphasize humanitarian response rather than long-term investments to reinforce inclusive, resilient and sustainable food systems, thus preventing spikes in humanitarian needs. At the same time, because they are rooted in different principles, humanitarian and development approaches toned to better complement one another in ways that create the most viable impacts with available funds for the for most affected and vulnerable targeted populations. Simply put, a shift is required to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of financing.

Consistency in external financing to food crisis countries, especially when these crises are protracted in nature, is key to protecting hard-fought development gains and ensure the effectiveness of humanitarian and development investments. It is widely recognized that multi-year conflict and risk-sensitive funding for addressing long-term crises has significant benefits: an increase in predictability, a more efficient response and better lasting outcomes for beneficiaries. It also has benefits for resource partners: more strategic partnerships, less administrative burden, time to define and monitor results, and space to add value to funding decisions through advocacy and policy work. In addition, a more systematic link between analysis of evolving underlying risks and actions is necessary to rapidly mobilize investments and pre-empt negative impacts on food security and on the food systems. Anticipatory Actions have been shown to curb projected increases in food insecurity, malnutrition and rural poverty by protecting lives and livelihoods.

Additional efforts are needed to further improve the analysis of the root causes of acute food insecurity, the monitoring of the food security, agriculture, and nutrition needs of the population, as well as to strengthen early warning mechanisms for Anticipatory Actions. These efforts will lead to improved targeting of external financing, and to increase its efficiency in reducing food insecurity and malnutrition, protecting livelihoods, and strengthening the resilience and sustainability of food systems in food crisis countries.

Lastly, noting that financing reporting is limited and tracking systems not yet optimal, it is important to improve these systems in order to improve transparency and understanding of the total resource flows (public and private, domestic and international) available to prevent, prepare for and address food crises. This would involve renewed efforts to align and track funding in a more timely manner, identify need and enable resources to be allocated more efficiently and effectively in anticipation and response to food crises.

This note provides a starting point for a deeper conversation among partners about the most effective ways to allocate funds to tackle the root causes of food crises in the long term.

Annexes

Annex 1.

Table 1: Total official development assistance and international humanitarian assistance to food sectors in 54 food crises in 2016-2019


Country	Official development assistance (USD millions)			International humanitarian assistance (USD millions)			
	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018	2019
Afghanistan	338.2	322.3	237.0	126.6	115.1	228.1	179.8
Angola	17.3	9.4	25.9	7.2	7.2	5.5	1.6
Bangladesh	231.1	262.8	275.9	7.5	204.9	241.1	241.4
Burkina Faso	162.1	183.4	185.8	53.0	35.4	46.0	48.3
Burundi	92.7	74.6	104.8	10.4	32.5	34.4	25.1
Cabo Verde	1.7	2.3	5.3	-	0.4	0.6	0.0
Cameroon	83.2	104.3	119.6	89.7	60.5	63.0	39.7
Central African Republic	31.4	17.8	19.5	43.8	83.9	101.6	104.4
Chad	40.9	50.2	95.9	140.7	167.0	179.3	150.2
Colombia	105.3	121.9	92.4	4.4	2.5	28.8	14.9
Côte d'Ivoire	50.6	42.2	64.6	3.3	0.5	-	0.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	99.9	141.3	191.2	134.6	164.4	353.2	368.3
El Salvador	23.8	12.9	16.1	0.6	-	-	1.6
Eswatini	10.1	21.6	8.8	18.3	6.8	5.6	0.5
Ethiopia	722.8	671.3	690.2	926.9	610.3	472.2	462.5
Gambia	13.1	23.4	24.0	1.8	0.1	1.2	0.2
Guatemala	75.5	78.7	80.8	2.2	8.8	23.6	21.1
Guinea	20.2	39.2	48.4	4.5	2.9	-	3.3
Guinea-Bissau	8.0	14.9	13.8	1.3	-	1.7	1.0
Haiti	126.0	141.3	157.3	76.6	69.1	29.1	45.9
Honduras	76.5	40.8	89.0	4.9	0.9	4.7	4.4
Iraq	23.6	16.1	17.6	174.6	222.4	119.2	54.5
Kenya	211.3	236.0	255.7	87.4	203.6	104.6	53.6
Lebanon	241.2	86.9	65.8	224.1	313.7	247.2	304.3
Lesotho	13.2	1.9	5.2	23.4	5.8	-	5.6
Liberia	44.3	37.2	26.2	2.6	0.5	1.0	0.5
Libya	1.3	0.0	1.2	15.4	18.4	5.2	3.7
Madagascar	148.7	120.5	111.2	45.6	39.5	24.8	30.1
Malawi	236.1	281.4	180.9	124.8	44.4	22.2	37.2
Mali	213.6	210.5	261.3	60.5	113.1	117.0	94.0
Mauritania	32.1	25.3	37.9	16.5	20.2	49.0	28.9
Mozambique	217.9	199.7	189.2	43.0	38.4	8.0	140.9
Myanmar	200.2	170.5	182.6	59.7	46.9	40.1	56.0
Namibia	11.1	7.7	10.0	1.0	0.3	-	1.0
Nicaragua	35.4	32.1	36.3	1.8	1.1	1.1	0.9

	Official development assistance (USD millions)			International humanitarian assistance (USD millions)			
	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018	2019
Niger	194.2	179.4	215.0	70.6	140.4	162.8	123.4
Country/territory	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018	2019
Nigeria	203.6	302.8	276.0	113.5	365.6	506.6	326.7
Pakistan	196.6	237.2	198.7	148.5	71.0	54.7	38.6
Palestine	47.1	47.9	48.8	173.0	160.3	133.2	148.5
Rwanda	147.3	193.9	128.6	6.3	7.3	14.9	14.3
Senegal	173.0	199.2	151.1	11.1	3.2	7.8	2.5
Sierra Leone	23.4	41.0	26.3	2.7	1.8	1.0	4.7
Somalia	46.7	42.9	95.9	259.1	680.2	489.2	509.8
South Sudan	110.4	184.5	290.9	671.7	717.0	732.1	690.4
The Sudan	83.6	62.9	220.9	310.6	166.0	240.3	197.8
Syrian Arab Republic	14.8	5.3	23.0	970.4	697.5	639.6	863.2
Turkey	515.1	339.3	236.0	147.2	26.3	29.9	6.2
Uganda	174.0	180.2	190.1	24.9	66.9	197.3	101.5
Ukraine	13.8	16.5	18.2	25.5	17.5	5.6	9.8
United Republic of Tanzania	230.7	245.0	235.0	14.1	32.1	23.6	25.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	1.9	0.3	2.8	-	-	3.8	8.6
Yemen	36.7	89.0	178.0	635.9	1,091.8	1,621.2	1976.0
Zambia	92.1	99.4	88.4	2.9	-	1.8	3.3
Zimbabwe	106.2	85.9	53.2	168.1	47.6	37.1	193.5
TOTAL food sectors assistance to food crises	6371.6	6355.2	6604.4	6294.7	6933.9	7461.7	7769.

Source: Development Initiatives calculations based on data extracted from OECD CRS, OCHA FTS, and Syria 3RP annual reports (for financial assistance data) and on GRFC 2020 (for identification of food crises).

Annex 2.

Figure 17: Acute food insecurity levels (millions people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), and international humanitarian assistance and official development assistance to food sectors (USD millions) by year in the 35 major food crises





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